Parasha: Mishpatim · Aliyah: Third (Tiferet)

כי יבער איש שדה, If a man cause a field to be consumed (the grain growing on it), etc. This verse has to be understood in conjunction with Baba Kama 56. Rav said that if someone places his own animal on a field of his neighbour, such field being full of growing grain, he is liable if his animal consumes some of it. The Talmud there adds that although this is obvious, we apply this rule even when the owner merely placed his ox in a position where it faced the growing field of his neighbour in every direction open to it; the owner of the ox is guilty although he had not actually led the animal by hand. The Torah writes: כי יבער איש, to tell us that even if the animal does not belong to the person who perpetrates this act, he is liable for the damage. The Torah goes on to say ושלח את בעירה, to tell us that even if he did not do what he did by hand but merely let loose his animal in the general direction of the neighbour's field failing to take precautions against his animal causing damage in his neighbour's field, he is liable for the damage caused by his beast.

כי תצא אש, If fire escapes (from someone's private domain), etc. The Torah means that even if one lights a fire in one's own private yard such a person is liable for damage caused by such fire outside his domain if the blaze was such that the owner should have foreseen it could extend beyond his own fence. If an individual lit a fire in his private yard which could not be expected to extend beyond his own boundaries he is free from responsibility if it happened unexpectedly. Such an accident would have to be considered an act of G'd (compare Baba Kama 61). When the Torah speaks about ומצאה קוצים, that the fire "finds thorns," it means that even if there were no other inflammables in its path, the fact that the stack of corn is consumed by fire results in the person starting the fire having to make repayment, שלם ישלם. He will have to pay for either the stack of corn or the field in which the corn is still growing, as the case may be. He will even have to pay for the stalks though the latter were a contributing cause to the corn being burned. All of this applies only if the fire "found" the thorns. If a person other than the one who started the fire contributed to its spreading, then that second person is liable for the entire damage which occurs as a result.

The Torah repeats the words המבעיר את הבערה "he who kindled the fire," to hint that the guilty party has to pay even for the stalks which were the real culprits in spreading the blaze.

Another aspect addressed by the word ומצאה, "and finds," is a situation where the person kindling the fire was unaware that there were any thorns in the vicinity, or where these thorns at least had not been present at the time the fire was kindled. It is presumed here that some third person came along and placed these thorns in a position where they created a hazard. In all of these situations the person kindling the fire is still liable for damage caused.

There is, of course, also a moral/ethical approach to this whole paragraph. The Torah describes the wicked practicing their wickedness in order to awaken man from his lethargic and mindless sleep when he observes how evil takes root all around him. The Torah says כי תצא אש, "when fire spreads," a simile traditionally describing people's problems. We find a description of this in Yuma 77 [discussing certain aspects of the prophet Ezekiel's vision in Ezekiel chapter 10, Ed.] where the archangel Gabriel is portrayed as asking the "man clothed in linen," (an angel in charge of fire) to prepare the destruction of Jerusalem by fire. This angel is to be regarded as a symbol of an intensified attribute of Justice at work.

When the Torah speaks of ומצאה קוצים, this is a reference to the wicked who are considered nothing but painful thorns. The expression ומצאה may be understood in a sense similar to Deut. 31,21 that "trouble befell them." The justification for using the word מצאה is that the wicked have no one who is responsible for them, either benevolently or otherwise. Wickedness means rejection of authority. G'd is the only true authority, and He has abandoned them as a result of their deliberate wickedness. Anything that happens in their lives subsequently is in the nature of a מציאה, a find, something one comes upon accidentally. Anyone who encounters such a person may do to him what he wants without divine interference. The verse also informs us that once fire has been given permission to act destructively, i.e. as the attribute of Justice, it will not only burn the thorns but it will also consume the stack of corn (the good, the useful). The choice of the word גדיש is an allusion to youngsters studying Torah, children who have not yet attained the height of adults, i.e. קמה. They are swept away together with the guilty as part of the troubles sweeping society. According to Shir Hashirim Rabbah on Song of Songs 1,4, when G'd was about to give the Jewish people the Torah He demanded guarantors that the people would continue to observe it. After having turned down the patriarchs as suitable guarantors, the Midrash relates that G'd accepted the people's children as their guarantors. This is the meaning of Psalms 8,3: "from the mouths of infants and sucklings You have established strength, etc." As a result of this arrangement the attribute of Justice is entitled to include such children in retribution when these forces are at work.

The Torah says: או הקמה, "or the standing corn;" this is a hint that on occasion when the destructive forces are about to engulf all of mankind, or all of the Jewish people, the choicest of the people are killed as an act of atonement for the members of their generation and in order to ensure that society as such can continue. This too is explained by Shir Hashirim Rabbah in connection with Song of Songs, 1,14 אשכל הכפר, the word הכפר being understood by the Midrash in the sense of כפרה, atonement. The Psalmist (Psalms 92,13) compares the upright posture of the righteous to that of a palm tree. Hence the term קמה describes צדיקים very aptly. On occasion the iniquities of the people have become so great that the death of the righteous is not enough to ensure the survival of the people. This is why the Torah mentions: או שדה, "or a field;" the field is an allusion to the totality of the Jewish people, i.e. there are circumstances when even the death of the children plus the death of the righteous are not sufficient atonement to give the rest of the people another lease on life.

The Torah informs us that a day will come when G'd will make a reckoning with the forces who have initiated all this, and on account of whom G'd had to use the children and the righteous as atonement for the common people. This is the meaning of: שלם ישלם המבעיר את הבערה, "the thorns which have kindled the fire will certainly have to make restitution." Sanhedrin 100 tells us that when the time comes, G'd will make sure that the wicked are tough enough to be able to endure all the suffering G'd has in store for them as part of the restitution they have to make. We have it on the authority of Bereshit Rabbah 63,10 that when the sons of the righteous reach maturity so that they are no longer punished for the sins their parents may have been guilty of, their parents make a feast at which they bless the Lord for having freed their children from being guarantors of the conduct of their fathers. [This appears to be the reverse of fathers blessing the Lord on the day their sons become of age because they, the fathers, are no longer liable for mistakes made by their children. Anyone interested in pursuing this is referred to the commentary of Rabbi David Luria on this Midrash. Ed.] At any rate, G'd punishes the ones who by their actions have released the forces of retribution in the world. The way a person is able to vanquish all these potential fires of his evil urge which if allowed to rage is apt to consume both the children and the righteous together, is if he is truly concerned about all these consequences that his own conduct will evoke and suppresses his evil inclination as a result of such concern. Our sages have taught us in Kidushin 40 that one should always view oneself as if the world teetered on a scale of guilty and innocent and the next action one performs decides in which direction the scales will tilt so that one holds the fate of mankind in one's hands, figuratively speaking. Should one make the wrong move one not only carries the guilt of an untold number of souls but is also responsible for all the souls which will never be born (placed inside bodies) due to the premature death of their parents. Alternatively, the reason the Torah repeats שלם ישלם is an allusion that G'd does not only bring retribution on the person who has started the actual fire but also on the one who has been the ultimate cause of such a fire, i.e. Satan. We have been taught in Sukkah 52 that the day will come when G'd "slaughters" the evil urge, (angel of death). At that time the angel of death will not even be able to escape to Bazrah, a reference to Betzer [the first city of refuge mentioned in the Torah Deut 4,43 Ed.] seeing that he was an intentional killer and as such does not qualify for taking refuge in such a city (compare Makkot 12). The Talmud Baba Kama 60 has interpreted the passage in Isaiah 63 in a different but also homiletical way.

כי יתן איש אל רעהו כסף, If a man deliver money to his neighbour (to keep), etc. Our sages in Baba Metzia 94 understood this passage as speaking of a שומר חנם, a trustee who does not get compensation for his trouble. As such he is not liable in the event the item on deposit with him was either stolen or lost. The sages there consider such a trustee as guilty of rendering an oath concerning any kind of misconduct a trustee could have committed. I do not know whence the sages derive their conclusion. The Torah obligated said trustee to swear that he had not been negligent in guarding the item properly against theft or disappearnce. Having sworn this oath he is free of any further liability. Rashi, (folio 95) in his commentary on the case of someone who borrows a neighbour's tools or beasts (without paying for the use) and who was guilty of some form of abuse, writes as follows in his introduction to the discussion of a שומר חנם. "The Torah deals with a situation where a wrong was committed, seeing the Torah uses the expression על כל דבר פשע in connection with the oath to be rendered." Whence does Rashi conclude that verse 6 speaks of a שומר חנם? Perhaps Rashi's reasoning is that the fact that verse 6 describes items such as money or utensils which normally do not require any special supervision seeing that they do not move about. It is likely that these are the items which a neighbour would undertake to guard without compensation. In verse 9, however, the Torah chooses as its examples such animals as a donkey, an ox, etc., animals which require much more supervision, something that one cannot expect from one's neighbour unless one pays him for his troubles.

אל רעהו, to his neighbour, etc. Our sages in Baba Metzia 56 understand this word as excluding a situation where the item was deposited with the Temple Treasurer for safe-keeping. The reason that such a Temple treasury is not liable for any damages is that there is no time when G'd Himself does not supervise everything entrusted to the Temple treasury. Requiring confirmation by an oath would be most inappropriate then.

כסף או כלים, money or utensils, etc. The Torah did not really have to write more than "when a man gives to his neighbour to keep, etc." Verse eight already lists all the various things which are subject to safe-keeping. Our sages deduce from here all the details of liability if the trustee did not exercise due care. If the verse had spoken about a keeper who does not receive compensation, the Torah needed to mention only money, why did the Torah add the additional "or utensils?" The Mechilta suggests that just as money is something one is in the habit of counting, the utensils mentioned are also of the kind which are normally counted; this statement is used for the principle that any claim not involving something that can be measured, counted, or weighed is not a true claim. Thus far the text of the Mechilta. There is no contradiction with what we have written. I believe that an additional reason for the Torah writing the word כלים is to tell us that even if the keeper was willing to compensate the owner by paying for the missing utensils he has not thereby discharged his liability of swearing an oath that he was not negligent in his guardianship. In chapter six of his Hilchot She-eylah u-Pikadon Maimonides writes that if the utensil in question was in good condition at the time he received it, the keeper has to render an oath (concerning his not having been at fault if it disappeared). While it is true that Maimonides considers this rule merely of rabbinic origin, he regards the Torah's words: "if he did not put his hands במלאכת רעהו," as proof that the only way the utensil was identifiable was that it was the work of his neighbour. Even if one could not identify it by size, weight or quantity, the keeper still has to render an oath if he claims he had lost it or that it had been stolen.

לשמור, to keep safe, etc. In his Mechilta Rabbi Yishmael describes a scenario according to which the owner deposited the items in the home of the keeper and told him: "keep it safe for me." If, however, he merely said to him: "your eyes are on it," the neighbour bears no responsibility. In Baba Kama 93 the sages interpret the word לשמור, to guard, as excluding liability for losing it, tearing it, or money which had been intended for distribution to the poor. It is evident from the words of Tossaphot on that folio that the Rabbi only meant to exonerate the keeper from negligence if the owner had not used the words: "keep it safe for me." If, however, the keeper had damaged or abused the utensil in question with his own hands he is still liable for compensating the owner unless the owner had specifically authorised the keeper to destroy the item in question. I find it hard to understand how the sages could deduce two separate exclusions from the word לשמור, A) that if the owner had not specifically worded his request by saying "keep it safe for me" that the keeper would not be liable for negligence, and b) that if the owner told the keeper to destroy it that he would not incur a penalty for doing so? I believe that the interpretation in the Mechilta is soundly based on our accepted principles of exegesis, whereas the statement in Baba Kama is merely based on logic. The author of that theory used the wording of the verse as an אסמכתא, a loose link to the written Torah, in order to support a rabbinic decree. You ought to realise that the reason the sages added the clause of excluding the keeper's liability if the ultimate designation of that money had been distribution of it to the poor, is based on the fact that it is money which has no legal claimants. Rabbi Yoseph cites an occurrence in which a purse full of money for the poor in Pumbedita arrived there. Rabbi Yoseph entrusted this money for safe-keeping to a trustee; the money was then stolen from said trustee due to the latter's negligence, and Rabbi Yoseph declared the keeper as liable to replace it. Abbaye queried this, citing a Baraitha in which the words לשמור ולא לחלק לעניים are used as the basis for exonerating the keeper from liability. Thereupon Rabbi Yoseph countered that this applied only if the money had not been allocated for the poor in a specific location (compare Rashi there). In that instance, however, the money had been intended for the poor people of Pumbedita and each one of them had a claim to a certain portion of this money. Seeing the matter is so, there was no need for the Torah to write a special exclusion such as the word לשמור in order to teach us that the keeper is not liable for money which has no legal claimants. As soon as the money had been designated for the poor, the owner, i.e. the person entrusting the purse containing such money to a neighbour for safe-keeping, no longer owned it and therefore could not hold anyone responsible for it. It should not make any difference whether the person entrusting the purse of money had told the keeper to distribute it to the poor or not; the keeper should be free from liability as the money has no legal claimants. The proof for this argument lies in Abbaye's query. What was Abbaye's argument? Perhaps in the case of Rabbi Yoseph the person handing the purse to the trustee had told him specifically: "guard it well?" Why did Abbaye not use the stronger argument that we can prove from the Baraitha that unless the trustee had been told specifically: "guard it well," he had not accepted liability for negligence even if the money had not been intended for distribution to the poor at all? Furthermore, the sages state in that Baraitha that Rabbi Nathan interpreted the word לשמור as including anything which is comparable to either money or utensils.

על כל דבר פשע, Concerning any matter of trespass, etc. Our sages in Baba Metzia 57 understand the first words על כל as an inclusive rule, whereas they consider the subsequent details, i.e. שור, חמור, etc., as exclusions of categories not fitting the details mentioned; the final words על כל אבדה are again nterpreted as an all inclusive rule covering any movable object which represents money. This excludes landed property which cannot be moved, slaves which are compared to land, as well as documents which are not viewed as constituting money. Maimonides rules similarly in chapter two of his Hilchot Geneyvah. The plain meaning of this ruling appears to be that if the שומר חנם was negligent in guarding either a slave or documents he would not be liable seeing that he would not even be liable for the disappearance of either money or utensils unless he had been negligent.

I have found the following statement by Maimonides in chapter two of his Hilchot Sechirut: "It appears to me that if the unpaid keeper was negligent in his supervision of slaves entrusted to him for safe-keeping, or in similar situations, he is liable to make restitution. The only reason we find an exemption to such liability in the case of slaves, documents, and lands, is when they have been stolen or lost and the keeper does not have to render an oath as to his not having been negligent. If, however, there is evidence of the keeper having committed a trespass, we follow the rule that everyone who commits a trespass is treated as if he had caused actual damage and has to make restitution. There is no distinction in such a situation between lands, documents, and movable objects considered as equivalent to money. Anyone examining this will find that this ruling is absolutely correct. Thus far Maimonides on the subject. Various commentators disagree with Maimonides on this, however. Their argument is that if the keeper (also a borrower) had indeed committed an actual trespass in the presence of the owner, he would not have been considered as guilty as the Torah states specifically that if the animal he borrowed died while the owner was present (i.e. had approved of the activity to which the borrower put such animal) the borrower does not have to pay (22,23). This includes a situation when the borrower was clearly guilty of trespass. Maimonides himself writes in chapter one of his Hilchot Sechirut that "even if he was guilty of trespass, i.e. negligent guardianship, as long as he had obtained permission for the activity the borrowed animal performed, the borrower is free from paying compensation. Maimonides cites Exodus 22,23 as proof for his ruling. Clearly, we cannot compare the law applicable to someone who is merely guilty of negligence to someone who has caused damage with his own hands. The פושע, negligent person, is neither in the category of a guardian nor is he an actual מזיק, spoiler. He is a person who had absented himself from his task of guarding an object, as a result of which the object entrusted to him disappeared. The spoiler, on the other hand, caused the damage himself. As a result the commentators query how it is possible that such a spoiler should not be responsible for his actions? At the very least the unpaid keeper should have to swear that he was not negligent seeing that if he was negligent he is guilty.

I believe that the commentators who attacked Maimonides by using the example of a borrower who uses the owner's animals or tools with his permission are quite wrong The situation they cite is an entirely different one from the one discussed by Maimonides. In that case the Torah had stated explicitly that the borrower is free from making restitution. When the Torah excluded an unpaid keeper's liability in the event he has been entrusted with a slave, documents, or land, the Torah nowhere excluded the keeper's liability in so many words even if the keeper was only negligent, never mind if he turned out to be a spoiler (מזיק). The Torah spoke only of a situation when such a keeper "did not put a hand to the matter entrused to him." This means that he is free only if he was not a מזיק. When we do hold an unpaid keeper responsible for lack of care this is only an outgrowth of the law applicable to a מזיק. How could we apply such an exclusion to something the Torah had not mentioned at all as being applicable to any category of a keeper? While it is true that if the negligence of such a keeper was not in the realm of being a spoiler we would have said that the Torah excluded him from all the categories of damage an unpaid keeper is liable for even if this was not mentioned by the Torah specifically. However, once we see that when the sages indict such an unpaid keeper they do so on the basis of the law of the spoiler, how can we suddenly apply such leniency in the matter? This is precisely why Maimonides wrote that the keeper in question must not be exonerated.

You may ask that seeing we treat the negligent keeper in a category similar to that of a spolier, then a householder who set ablaze the stack of corn of a hired hand or the hired hand's garment should equally be exonerated, for the negligent person is equivalent to a spoiler whom the Torah has exonerated. Perhaps the Torah meant to exonerate only a keeper who became a spoiler not any other spoiler such as the householder referred to in the most recent example. Furthermore, it appears that even Maimonides will admit that a negligent person is not considered as exactly in the same class as the spoiler, and that if he burned a garment entrusted to him for safe-keeping by its owner he is obligated to replace it. You will find that Maimonides writes in chapter 21 of his Hilchot Ishut that if a wife broke utensils (of her husband) while engaged in the authorised use of same, she is exonerated by a decree of the rabbis. Thus far Maimonides. Commentators remark on this that the woman should at least have to swear that she had not been careless! Concerning such an oath Maimonides writes in chapter 4 of Hilchot She-eylah u-Pikadon that if someone deposits an object with his neighbour for unpaid safe-keeping and it is stolen, the keeper has to swear that he has not laid a hand on said object; seeing that he already has to swear one oath, he is required to add that he has not been negligent either and that the theft did not occcur after he had laid a hand on the object entrusted to him. We can see from the wording that Maimonides considers the principle of the oath as a biblical injunction which covers only the fact that the object had indeed been stolen and is no longer in the keeper's possession. Maimonides clearly considers the oath that the keeper was not negligent as something secondary, rabbinic in nature. If not for the original oath, the keeper would not have had to swear an oath regarding negligence at all. We do not find one word in the Torah concerning an oath about negligent guardianship. It follows that when there is no injunction in the Torah that an oath has to be sworn, the rabbis have not imposed an oath concerning negligence either.

As a result of the considerations we have just outlined, the exclusion in the Torah which we derived from the list of movable items such as oxen, donkeys, etc., applies only to such oaths in which the keeper declares that he has not himself laid a hand on the objects entrusted to him. If the injured party claims that the keeper has been negligent, he must swear a שבועת הסת, an oath designed to pacify the claimant, an oath instituted by the rabbinic authorities in the period of the Talmud. This oath is mentioned by Rabbi Nachman (Baba Metzia 5) as a rabbinic ordinance. According to the Talmud there the reason we would be unable to apply this oath in the case of Rabbi Yoseph who had entrusted to someone money for safe- keeping is that we do not superimpose one rabbinic ordinance on another. We described the details of the matter of Rabbi Yoseph on page 730. It is clear from Abbaye's question in that story that he felt that the Torah had exonerated the keeper even from the obligations for which a negligent keeper is liable, seeing that there was no one who could legally have claimed this money.

בין שניהם, between them both. The Torah implies that both the person rendering the oath and the one causing the oath to be sworn are punishable should the owner be aware that the keeper plans to swear falsely.

אם בעליו עמו לא ישלם, if its owner be present he does not have to pay. We have to consider whether the party exonerated by the Torah in this paragraph is free from restitution only by a human tribunal or whether he is exonerated also vis-a-vis Heaven, i.e. in the Hereafter. Suppose the owner of the universe, G'd, Who has entrusted the soul He has planted in a human body for safe-keeping in his body will demand an accounting from the body when He reclaims an unsullied soul at the death of the person to whom He has entrusted the soul. We read in Deut. 4,9: "you shall guard your soul very carefully." When G'd will reclaim His souls He may find that they have either been "stolen," or "broken," or "captured," or "died." All of these four kinds of "damages" are applicable to souls and may be the result of the person equipped with the respective soul committing various transgressions. [In order to understand what the author refers to the reader has to remember that the author has adopted the concept that each commandment in the Torah corresponds to a specific organ, bone, or sinew of the human body. Non-performance of a commandment is equivalent to maiming that part of the body. Ed.] Some people have their souls "stolen" from them when the person is involved in an encounter with impurity; others lose their soul when involved in a deliberate act of transgression; in such an instance the person is considered as having destroyed the limb or organ charged with performance of that particular commandment. Sometimes a person is guilty of a transgression for which the penalty is כרת, premature death and/or permanent severance from his people. Still others may commit violations punishable with death by a human tribunal. Such sins cause the death of the soul (compare Genesis 17,14). In other cases the soul is merely taken "captive" as per Zohar volume two page 95. When G'd -the owner of the deposit- demands its return in the condition He has deposited it, the spirit is supposed to return to G'd as stated by Solomon in Kohelet 12,7. Our sages in Shabbat 152 interpret this to mean as G'd saying: "give it to Me as it was given to you." Can the keepers, i.e. human beings, decline liability for damage to their soul by basing themselves on the wording in our verse: "if its owner was present, the keeper does not have to pay?" The sages in Baba Metzia 97 state that it is possible for the borrower to escape liability for what he has borrowed if he asks the owner of the article he wishes to borrow to first let him drink some of his water. If the owner agrees, he is considered as in the category described in our verse as having worked with the consent of the owner. The same ruling is applicable to "keepers" (seeing their liability is generally on a lower level than that of the borrower). Seeing that G'd has provided man with his food and drink before man begins to be active on earth, He should be considered as in the category of the lender described in the Talmud, and man should be free from liability for his mistakes.

I am duty bound to tell the human soul not to rely on such convoluted reasoning for either of two reasons. 1) In our verse the Torah tells us explicitly that "keepers" are liable in accordance with all the rules applicable for the various categories of such guardians listed in Baba Metzia 94. The Talmud even says that the owner of the object entrusted to an unpaid keeper may stipulate that the unpaid keeper assumes all the liabilities of a person who borrows with a view to using the object under his care. This is so in spite of the general rule that one may not impose conditions which override those stipulated in the Torah, as in this case only financial dealings are involved. Above-named restriction does not apply in matters concerning money. In practice this means that the owner may hold the borrower (or guardian) responsible even if the latter had undertaken to perform tasks with the borrowed object with the knowledge (read consent) of the owner. We find an example of this in Makkot 3 where the lender of a long term loan stipulated that the law of Shmittah (automatic cancellation of past-due loans) not be invoked against him, and that the loan in question would be due after the Shmittah year. The Talmud explains the reason for this as being that all financial conditions mutually agreed between two parties are binding. In our instance, G'd has made it plain in His Torah that violating His laws will result in retribution. Moreover, He has even made the Israelites render an oath concerning their obligation to live up to the commandments of the Torah.

The second reason that man cannot avail himself of the legislation which exonerates negligent behaviour of the borrower in the presence of the lender has to do with the principle that only a few of man's trespasses are subject to judicial prosecution on earth. In principle, it is the Supreme Judge who has the prerogative to sit in judgment of human activities and to adjudicate such cases fairly. Who is to say that a person who is guilty of negligent dealings with his neighbour's property will not be judged by the Supreme Judge Himself? We have hundreds of instances of violations which are subject to G'd's judgment only, human judges not having been accredited to deal with such violations of the Torah! The best proof of this concept is the fact that there are many violations concerning which the Torah has specifically stated that the transgressor will not be held liable by a court on earth but will be judged either by G'd directly while still alive, or at least in the Hereafter. I have explained this in detail on Exodus 21,12 on the words מות יומת. You will find for instance, that when "keepers" have been negligent with property owned by the Temple treasury they are not subject to penalties by a human court. Even Maimonides who held keepers liable in cases where lands, documents or slaves are involved, appears to hold that this is so only vis-a-vis human owners. When the property is owned by Heaven or its representatives, no action is taken against the offending party. You may conclude that the reason that no action is taken is because such people are guilty of something more serious than is subject to earthly judges' jurisdiction.

וגר לא תונה, "You shall not wrong a stranger, etc." Rashi says that if the Jew were to remind the stranger of his idolatrous past, he has to be prepared to be reminded by the stranger of his own unsalutary past. Ibn Ezra says that we must remember that we were once no better than the stranger. Nachmanides disagrees with both these interpretations and says that we must remember that G'd will respond to the oppressed just as He responds to our own outcries when warranted.

Once we remind ourselves that the souls of the Jewish people are the very root of sanctity seeing that Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and their offspring were part of G'd's heritage, we can understand that Jews do not react to insults heaped upon them by the Gentiles. We do not even view such people as in the category of אדם. It is this attitude vis-a vis the Gentiles that provides the background for Jews belittling Gentiles, even those Gentiles who have ceased worshiping idols. As a result the Torah saw fit to tell us why we must not remind strangers of their idolatrous past. We are not to tell such people that they are rooted in the domain of the קליפות, i.e. that their intrinsic worth is inferior to ours. When the Torah reminds the Jewish people: "for you were strangers in the land of Egypt," this should be understood according to my comment on Genesis 46,3 and Exodus 20,2. I have demonstrated there that while the Jewish people resided in Egypt their own souls were mired deeply in the same moral morass that the souls of the Egyptians found themselves in.

אם ענה תענה אותו, If you afflict them in any way, etc." Why did the Torah have to write the word אותו, "him," and did not merely write אם תענהו, using the pronoun ending? We would have known that the subject of the verse is the orphan just mentioned. Perhaps we can best explain this with the help of the Mechilta on the words לא תענון. The author writes that but for the word לא תענון in verse 21, I would have thought that this injunction applies only to widows and orphans. Whence do I know that one must not treat people generally in an exploitative manner? This is why the Torah writes לא תענון. Thus far the Mechilta. Since the words לא תענון apply to people as a whole, the word אותו in verse 22 is needed to tell us that the special penalty in store for people transgressing this commandment spelled out in verse 23 applies only if the violation was committed against either a widow or an orphan.

אם כסף תלוה, If you lend money, etc. Rabbi Yishmael says in the Mechilta that the word אם in any other verse in the Torah means that something is optional. In this case the word אם means "when" and not "if." We need to understand the whole concept of G'd employing the word אם to describe things which may or may not occur. Why does G'd not phrase legislation in a definitive manner? Perhaps the Torah wants to provide an answer also to those who ask why some people seem to enjoy far more riches than they can possibly need in their lives. Such a questioner may well point to our patriarch Jacob (Genesis 28,20) who asked G'd for the necessities of life, i.e. bread to eat, and clothes to wear." While we can understand that depriving man of his necessities may have morally rewarding results seeing that the person so deprived may be punished for wrongdoing and may turn to prayer in order to expiate his guilt, what is the educational value of giving someone excess wealth? Our verse provides the answer to this question. Generally speaking, G'd in His great kindness provides generously for the needs of all His creatures. He allocates a fixed amount for these needs. When a person has not qualified for receiving his needs at the hands of G'd directly because he is guilty of sinful conduct, G'd does not recall the amount that would have been allocated to such a person, but He redirects it to someone else. As a result, the person who does not receive his livelihood from G'd directly, either suffers deprivation or is forced to receive his livelihood through another channel. Receiving one's livelihood by means of a fellow human being instead of at the hands of G'd is demeaning for the recipient. When G'd re-allocates the channels by which such a sinful person receives his livelihood, He practices two virtues. 1) By punishing the person in question in this world for his sins, the sinner is encouraged to rehabilitate himself. 2) G'd gives the wealthy person an opportunity to use his wealth constructively by performing charitable deeds.

This is the true meaning of: "when you lend money to My people, the poor who is with you." The Torah suggests that if we find ourselves in possession of more than we need, we are to lend it to someone whom the Torah, i.e. G'd, describes as עמי, "My people." The meaning of this verse is that if you become aware that you have more money than you need for your personal requirements it is clear that the excess had originally belonged to someone else, i.e. "the poor amongst you." This is a clear hint that you should open your hand to lend to the poor part of what used to be his, or had been intended for him. Perhaps the Torah even hinted to the wealthy person that when he extends a loan to the poor he should not credit himself with being a superior person seeing that the loan only represents a partial return to the poor of what had originally been intended for him by G'd Himself. This may also be the reason why the Torah says: "do not act as if you were his creditor." The word נשה is related to נשיאות, a superior status or posture; the Torah reminds the lender that what he lends to the poor was the property of the poor in the first place. This is why the Torah goes on to speak about the prohibition to charge interest on the loan.

אם חבול תחבול שלמת רעך, "If you take your neighbour's garment as a pledge, etc." The moral/ethical message of this verse may be to awaken a person in whose hand the garment of the king (G'd) has been entrusted. Proverbs 27,10 states: רעך ורעת אביך אל תעזב, "do not forsake your friend or the friend of your father." The person in question is supposed to relate to said garment in the manner described in Shabbat 152. The return of the soul to G'd is compared there to a king who had distributed Royal garments to his servants. The intelligent ones folded these garments and placed them in a chest for safe-keeping. The fools wore them and performed their daily routines while wearing them. When the day came when the king asked that his gaments be returned, the intelligent servants returned them in good condition, ironed, etc. The fools returned the garments soiled, crumpled, etc. The king rejoiced when he observed the care taken by his intelligent servants, while he was angry at the foolish servants. He sent the former back to their homes in peace whereas he made the fools spend a long time in jail while the garments were being cleaned. We have already explained that man's soul is part of G'd's light. The Psalmist describes G'd as garbed in light (Psalms 104,2). G'd ordered that if the item (soul) He had given man as a pledge had become soiled, i.e. that man had committed sins while "wearing" the soul, there would come a time when he has to return this pledge (i.e. his death, described in our verse as "sunset"). Psalms 90,3 speaks about "the soul returning to dust, or broken-hearted." Our sages in Kohelet Rabbah 2, understand the word דכא as the dismay of death; man was given an opportunity to repent until the day he died, i.e. until the day his sun set.

The reason the Torah repeated the words חבול תחבול, is that every Israelite has three levels of soul known in ascending order as נפש, רוח, נשמה. Our verse refers to all three levels of his soul. When the Torah speaks of אם חבול, it refers to the נשמה. The word תחבול refers to the רוח; whereas the words שלמת רעך refer to the נפש. The Torah repeats this division when it defines the nature of these respective levels of pledges, i.e. the words כי היא כסותה לבדו, "for that is his only covering," refer to the נשמה. The words היא שמלתו לעורו, "it is the garment of his skin," refer to the רוח level of man's soul; finally, the words במה ישכב, "wherein he shall sleep," refer to the נפש level of man's soul. The latter is the remnant of the soul which remains with man even while he is in the grave as we know from Job 14,22: ונפשו עליו תאבל, "and his soul will mourn him."

The Torah goes on to say: "it will be if he cries out to Me;" here the Torah returned to the requirement to give back the soul to G'd in the condition it had been received and assures man that he does not need to despair. If he cries out to G'd, i.e. if he is truly penitent, ושמעתי, G'd assures him: "I will listen for I am gracious." G'd assures man that he will wipe out his sins.