Parasha: Emor · Aliyah: First (Chesed)

ויאמר ה׳ אל משה, אמור וגו׳ G'd said to Moses: "say! etc." Why does this paragraph begin with the word אמור instead of the word דבר which is the customary introduction when G'd announces legislation? Furthermore, why did the Torah mention the "adjective," i.e. the priests before mentioning the noun that the "adjective" belongs to, i.e. the "sons of Aaron?" The correct description should have been בני אהרון הכהנים! Our sages both in Torat Kohanim and elsewhere have offered a number of explanations why the Torah chose this order. Perhaps the Tanchuma is worth quoting. "G'd said to Moses: 'it is not fitting that someone who goes in and out of My Tabernacle should be exposed to looking at dead bodies all the time, etc.'" Thus far Tanchuma. The address with the word אמור implies a compliment, an advantage; the words אל הכהנים is intended to justify the compliment, i.e. because the priests go in and out in the Tabernacle, i.e. in G'd's Presence where they perform service for the King of Kings. What does this compliment or advantage consist of? The priests are not to defile themselves through contact with the dead, as mentioned in Tanchuma. Seeing the כהנים are privileged to enter the Tabernacle and to be in G'd's presence most of the time, their present superior status is mentioned first before the Torah tells us how they came to be priests, i.e. through being descendants of Aaron. If the Torah had used the customary phraseology this point would not have come across.

ואמרת אלהם לנפש לא יטמא בעמיו, "and say to them not to defile himself for the dead amongst his people." Why is the word ואמרת i.e. אמור ואמרת repeated? Our sages in Yevamot 114 as well as in Torat Kohanim offer a variety of commentaries on this. I believe that there is room for still other approaches not yet explored by our classical commentaries. We may do well to refer to what Maimonides wrote in chapter 3 of his treatise on the rules to be observed by mourners. This is what he wrote: "If someone deliberately defiles a priest and the priest co-operates of his own free will, the priest is subject to the corporal punishment of 39 lashes, whereas the person who initiated the defilement is guilty of transgressing the injunction not to place an obstacle in the path of a blind man (Leviticus 19,14). Neither Radbaz nor Maharik comment on this. The problem is whence does Maimonides get the ruling that the priest is liable to 39 lashes? Lechem Mishneh comments as follows: "Maimonides wrote in his treatise on kilayim that if someone dresses a fellow Jew in garments containing a mixture of wool and linen such a person is guilty of 39 lashes provided the person wearing this mixture is unaware of committing a sin." Kesseph Mishneh (Rabbi Joseph Karo) queries this ruling mentioning that the Rosh asked this question of the Rashba without receiving an answer. Perhaps Maimonides' source was Nazir 44 according to which the person who defiles a Nazir is not treated in the same way as the Nazir who became defiled as a result of that person's doing. This is based on Numbers 6,9: וטמא ראש נזרו which means that under normal circumstances the same guilt applies to the person causing the sin as to the one committing it. This is why Maimonides writes in chapter 5,20 of his treatise about the laws of the Nazirite that in this case if the Nazir himself was unaware of committing a sin neither he nor the person defiling him deliberately is subject to מלקות, corporal punishment. Maimonides quotes the verse in Numbers 6,9 as the basis for his ruling. He understands that verse to mean that culpability does not occur until the Nazirite himself defiles his head. This ruling appears incomprehensible. 1) Why should the Nazirite legislation not serve as a בנין אב, as a model for many other similar situations where two parties are involved in committing a sin, the first one being guilty of לפני עור לא תתן מכשול? Furthermore, the situation involving the Nazirite required a special verse to exclude culpability because I could have learned a קל וחומר from the situation in which he shaved his hair and is guilty. Seeing that defiling himself is a more serious sin than shaving off his hair, the Torah had to write a verse to tell us that even defiling himself does not carry the penalty of מלקות. If this is so, it follows that had it not been for this קל וחומר, I would not have needed to write a single verse to exclude the Nazirite's not being guilty of מלקות if someone had deliberately defiled him. In fact the query against Maimonides's ruling in chapter 3 of his treatise on the laws for mourners would have been still stronger!

I believe the true reason why Maimonides ruled as he did is based on the Talmud in Nazir 44. This is what the Talmud writes there: "if in the case of someone defiling the Nazirite we do not treat the person causing the impurity as equally guilty as the person who has become defiled (although as a result of this action the preceding days of the Nazirite's abstention are completely invalidated), then in the parallel case of someone shaving off the Nazirite's hair I most certainly would not treat such a person as guilty of corporal punishment (seeing the result of his action did not cause the Nazirite to lose more than a maximum of thirty days of the preceding days during which he had not shaved)! The Torah therefore had to write the word תער לא יעביר על ראשו that the Nazirite must not allow someone else to shave him, to insure that I do not learn such a קל וחומר. According to the Talmud we equate the spelling לא יעביר with the spelling לא יעבור, i.e. that he himself must not apply the razor to his own hair or to someone else's hair. Rashi corrects this wording by saying "someone else must not apply a razor to the hair of the Nazirite." We now need to examine why the Talmud assumes that the word לא יעביר (which is spelled defective) refers to someone other than the Nazirite himself applying the razor to his hair. If the Talmud applied the principle of using our tradition as the basis for the spelling, the word יעבר should have been spelled יעביר with the letter י to indicate the fact that it is meant transitively, i.e. לשון הפעיל. Even if we were to argue that the absence of the letter י is not crucial to the meaning, at least the word לו is missing without which I would not know that the meaning of יעבר without the letter י is transitive and that the Nazirite must not shave others!

I believe that the Talmud concentrated on the fact that the Torah used the expression תער לא יעבר על ראשו, "a razor must not pass over his head," instead of the simple לא יגלח את ראשו, "he must not shave his head," or at least לא יעביר על ראשו with the letter י to indicate the transitive meaning of the expression. If the Torah had used the simple expression we would have known that the prohibition applied to the person who was commanded not to shave rather than to the action of the razor. The word יעביר would refer to the Nazir himself who is mentioned adjacently in that verse. The Torah would then have attributed the prohibition to the person committing it and not to the action of the razor. This would not be the impression if we accept the wording תער לא יעבור על ראשו, "a razor must not be applied to his head;" this wording suggests that the principal concern of the Torah is the fact that the hair of the Nazirite is shaved, regardless by whom. This is what the Talmud had in mind with the words: קרי ביה לא יעבור הוא ולא יעביר לו אחר, "read as if it said: 'neither he himself nor someone else must apply the razor to his head.'" Clearly the word is meant to prohibit shaving the Nazirite either by himself or someone else. The words קרי ביה in the Talmud are not really accurate but they describe a concept rather than a grammatical comment.

We can now extrapolate to the laws of כלאים in 19,19 where the Torah wrote: ובגד כלאים שעטנז לא יעלה עליך, "a garment made of a mixture of linen and wool shall not cover you" (יעלה עליך) instead of writing לא תעלה עליך. The word תעלה is transitive and applies to the person putting such a garment on the wearer. The word יעלה is intransitive and applies to the garment rather than to the person putting it on. The Torah's wording makes it plain that it is immaterial who puts the garment on the wearer. If he wears it knowingly he is guilty of violating the prohibition of כלאים. This is why Maimonides rules in chapter 10 subsection 1 of his treatise Hilchot Kilayim that "if someone deliberately places a garment containing a mixture of linen and wool on a fellow Jew he is subject to 39 lashes." Similarly, any ruling in our situation dealing with the defilement of the priest is based on the wording לא יטמא, "he (the priest) must not become defiled." The fact that the Torah does not add a pronoun indicating that it is only the priest himself who must not defile himself makes the verse a warning to anyone else not to contribute to the defilement of the priest. It follows that anyone who defiles a priest, be it the priest himself or someone else, is subject to the penalty of 39 lashes. Maimonides is consistent in all his rulings then.

This brings us to the reason why the Torah saw fit to repeat the word אמר, by writing אמר ואמרת. It is simply that the Torah commands both the priest himself and anyone else not to defile him. The word אמר tells the priest not to defile himself, whereas the word ואמרת tells others not to defile the priest. Perhaps the word אלהם, "to them," refers back to the Israelites (not the priests) who are commanded to observe all the commandments. You will note that at the very end of this chapter (verse 24) the Torah writes: "Moses spoke to Aaron, to his sons and to all the children of Israel." This indicates that the legislation in this chapter is addressed to all of the Israelites. This justifies our explanation that also at the beginning of the chapter the Torah extends a warning to the whole people, not just to the priests, that they must not cause the priests to become ritually defiled. Torat Kohanim on 21,24 writes as follows: "The words וידבר משה are a warning to Aaron through his children whereas the words אל כל בני ישראל are a warning to the sons by the Israelites. They are each warned to ensure that the others do not become guilty of the sin of ritual impurity." Both what we read in Torat Kohanim and what we have written ourselves are דברי אלוקים חיים, legitimate exegesis of the text of the Torah.

לנפש לא יטמא, "he must not become defiled through a dead body." Torat Kohanim derives from this word נפש that contact with an amount of blood equivalent to 86 grams (רביעית) is sufficient to confer ritual impurity on the priest. I have seen that Maimonides writes as follows in chapter 3 subsection 1 of his Hilchot Avel: "There is no halachic difference between impurities of the body of the dead and impurities which emanated in the body of the dead (such as blood which oozed out) seeing the Torah used the expression נפש when prohibiting ritual defilement through the dead." Commentators attack Maimonides for this statement basing themselves on a Baraitha in Torat Kohanim which writes as follows: "From our verse (21,1) I only learn that one defiles oneself through contact with the dead body itself. Whence do we know that one also becomes defiled through contact with the blood (of the dead person?)" Answer: This is why the Torah wrote the otherwise extraneous word לנפש. How do I know that all other excretions from the dead body also confer ritual impurity on contact? This is why the Torah added the word אלהם." Thus far Torat Kohanim. Kesseph Mishneh defends Maimonides by pointing out that he must have thought that the word לנפש is sufficient to teach us that everything which originates in the dead body confers the same degree of ritual impurity on all those who come in contact with it; there is no need for further scriptural proof; any additional word in the Torah is only in the nature of an אסמכתא, something to jog our memory. Thus far Kesseph Mishneh. I do not accept the comment by the author of Kesseph Mishneh. What gave Maimonides the right to come up with a new approach other than the one of the Baraitha?

The fact of the matter is that Maimonides bases himself on another Baraitha which he found in Pessikta. This is what is written there: "The words אמר ואמרת are meant to tell us that the adults are warned to see to it that the minors do not become ritually impure; the words לנפש לא יטמא are intended to tell us that even a רביעית דם, a small amount of 86 grams of blood is enough to confer ritual impurity on contact if it has escaped from the dead body." Thus far the Pessikta. The Baraitha we just quoted is mentioned in Yevamot 114. We are entitled to understand that Baraitha as including all other excretions from the dead body as being included in this legislation based on the word לנפש, seeing the author used the repetition of the words אמר ואמרת as commanding the adults to warn the minors concerning this legislation. I am quite certain that the author of the Kesseph Mishneh had not seen or remembered this latter Baraitha. Proof of this is to be found in something the same author wrote in the same chapter we have quoted earlier in subsection 12. "Adult priests are responsible to see that they do not cause a priest who is a minor to become ritually impure. If, however, the priest who is a minor causes himself to become ritually impure it is not the task of the Jewish court to prevent this." So far Maimonides on the subject. According to Kesseph Mishneh this is in accordance with Rashi's interpretation of the meaning אמר ואמרת. Clearly, if the author of Kesseph Mishneh had known about this Baraitha he would not have written that Maimonides based his ruling on Rashi's exegesis which is of much more recent origin.

There remains the question of how anyone derived from the word לנפש that a רביעית of blood confers ritual impurity on contact? Perhaps we must understand that the meaning of the word לנפש is confined to the ability of blood to confer ritual impurity to the category of impurity called טומאת מת, as distinct from other categories of ritual impurities. It would have sufficed for the Torah to write למת לא יטמא that the priest must not become ritually impure through a dead body. The fact that the Torah added the word לנפש led our sages to conclude that an amount of blood which is sufficient to keep an organism alive is the amount which is capable of conferring the ritual impurity associated with dead bodies. People who are themselves ritually impure only through indirect contact with the dead are not included in that definition of לנפש.

לא יטמא. "He must not become defiled." The Torah switched to the use of the singular although the verse had commenced with G'd addressing the Israelites in the plural, i.e. אלהם. According to the reasoning of the scholar who explained the repetition of the words אמר ואמרת as a warning that a person other than the priest himself should also not cause the priest to become defiled, the switch from plural to singular is easy to understand, i.e. the people (pl.) are commanded not to defile the priest (sing.).

In addition, the Torah may have been afraid to write לא יטמאו, "they shall not become defiled" as the impression would have been that the Torah only minded if the priests as a group became defiled, not if an individual priest became defiled. The Torah therefore worded the commandment in the singular i.e. יטמא to show the Torah shows its concern for the defilement of each individual priest.

Furthermore, the Torah had to avoid the comparison of this legislation with Leviticus 10,9 where the Torah commanded that the priests were not to enter the Tabernacle while intoxicated. In that instance the legislation was phrased as applicable only in connection with the priests entering the precincts of the Tabernacle drunk when they were about to perform the sacrificial service. The impression left was that at times when the priests were not engaged in service they were free to indulge in wine and alcohol. It would have been easy to deduce from there that when the priests were not about to engage in sacrificial service they are at liberty to defile themselves. The Torah used the singular when legislating this commandment to make it clear that the priests are not to defile themselves at any time, except for the occasions listed in subsequent verses. This teaches that the prohibition for a priest to defile himself is totally unconnected to the Temple-service and its requirements. The Temple-service, after all, is not in danger of becoming defunct due to the temporary impurity of a single priest. The duty of the priest to remain in a state of ritual purity is one that devolves upon him independent of any consideration for the function he can perform only while in such a state.

כי אם לשארו, except to his wife, etc. Torat Kohanim explains that the meaning of the word שארו is "his wife." The words הקרוב, "who is close," a word which is not really necessary, refers to the exclusion of ארוסה, a woman betrothed to a priest who does not yet live in his home, the final marriage vows not having been completed as yet. She is excluded from relatives for the sake of whose burial a priest must defile himself as a mourner. The word אליו "to him," another extraneous word, teaches that the death of a divorced wife of a priest also does not qualify as an excuse for her erstwhile husband to defile himself ritually. The reason is that such a woman is no longer קרוב, close to her former husband the priest. Why does the Torah add the words לאמו ולאביו? Seeing the mother is not of the same tribe as the son (or is subject to being demoted in status if she survives her husband the priest), I might have thought that the son may not defile himself at her death. The Torah therefore had to tell us that the son is to defile himself at his mother's death. Once we have established this, why would I have thought that the son must not defile himself over the death of his father unless the Torah spelled this out for us? Would I not have reasoned that inasmuch as the son must defile himself at his mother's death even though the mother was most likely not the daughter of a priest, the son most certainly has to defile himself at his father's death seeing the father was a priest also (and is not subject to lose his status through the death of his spouse)? The Torah had to write that the son who is a priest must defile himself due to the death of his father although we do not know for a fact that the man who described himself as his father really was his father. Paternity is established only by reason of חזקה not by reason of definitive knowledge such as maternity. The scholars of Luneil raised an objection to this Torat Kohanim. They felt there was no need for the Torah to mention that the son must defile himself at the death of his father as I could have arrived at this legislation by learning a קל וחומר from his mother. They reasoned that the son has to defile himself precisely because either the father is a priest who does not cause himself to be demoted and as such qualifies as a close relative even more than the mother who is subject to demotion in status; or there is no certainty that his father is his real father in which case the son is not a priest and there is no reason he cannot defile himself at the death of this man. [the scholars of Luneil described the son as a bastard, something I have not been able to understand. Why could the father not simply have been a non-priest claiming to be a priest? Ed.]

Our author does not consider the objection of the scholars of Luneil as serious seeing our verse is concerned with permitting something which had so far been forbidden to the parties concerned. We cannot permit something which was forbidden by using the קל וחומר (according to the principle דיו לבוא מן הדין כנדון) as our exegetical instrument. All a קל וחומר can accomplish is to teach that a situation is similar to the one which forms the basis of the קל וחומר; It cannot teach additional halachot of a more stringent nature. The Torah permits the son to defile himself for the sake of near relatives whereas the prohibition to defile himself at the death of more distant relatives remains in force. Furthermore, in the event that the son does not want to defile himself, he is forced to do so as part of honouring his father who has died. This is the meaning of the words לה יטמא, "he must defile himself for her sake." Torat Kohanim explain these words by saying: "it is a positive commandment for every priest to defile himself at the death of any of the seven relatives mentioned in our verse." While it is true that the Torah wrote this expression only next to the sister of the priest, Torat Kohanim already explained this in connection with a true story involving a priest called Joseph whose wife died on Passover eve and the priest did not want to defile himself so as not to forego the commandment to offer the Passover sacrifice, etc. The local rabbinic authorities forced that husband to defile himself and take part in the burial of his wife. Thus far the story related in Torat Kohanim. The story proves that the authorities did not restrict the meaning of the words לה יטמא as applicable only in the event a priest loses a sister. What all this proves is that one must defile oneself for the sake of any of the relatives enumerated in verses 2 and 3. It follows that if I had derived the directive to defile oneself at the death of one's father based on exegesis alone I could not have arrived at such a law as I would not have been able to be certain that the man who died was indeed the father of the son described here. I certainly would not have been entitled to refrain from offering the Passover sacrifice if such a "father" had died on the eve of Passover. Doubts concerning the application of a biblical commandment cannot be resolved through abrogation of that commandment, even temporarily. Not only would such a son not be permitted to defile himself on the father's grave based on the doubt (according to Maimonides and Pri Chadash who hold that doubt concerning a biblical commandment's applicability may be resolved by a lenient ruling), but even according to those who hold that we never apply a lenient ruling when the doubt concerns a biblical injunction the son could still not defile himself merely on the chance that the deceased was not his real father and as a result postpone celebrating the Passover on time. After all, no doubt exists about the need to perform the commandments connected with Passover. The Torah therefore had to write both the words לאמו ולאביו to tell us that a son who is a priest must defile himself for the purpose of bringing either his father or his mother to burial.

Furthermore, we are dealing here with a situation where the son's status as a priest is based only on the assumption that his father who claims to be his father is also a priest, another assumption which is itself not based on definitie evidence. In view of the fact that neither son nor father can establish a definitve claim as to their paternity and priesthood respectively, I would not have allowed the son to violate his legal status and defile himself on the basis of a חזקה that the man he knew as his father was indeed his father unless the Torah had decreed this specifically

ולבנו ולבתו ולאחיו, "and for the death of his son, his daughter or his brother." Torat Kohanim comment as follows on this verse: "The Torah should have been content to mention the son and the daughter; why did the Torah also have to write that the son must defile himself for the sake of burying his father and his mother? If the Torah wrote that a father must defile himself in order to bury his son or daughter whom he is not obligated to honour, is it not logical that he certainly has to defile himself for the sake of burying his father or mother whom he is obligated to honour?" If this reasoning were correct, I would have had to conclude that the words "son or daughter" were meant to apply to children who were aborted and had never drawn a breath of life. The Torah therefore had to write the words "son and daughter" to ensure that I would not apply the קל וחומר we just described. The Torah told us that only sons and daughters who had demonstrated viability qualify for their father the priest defiling himself at their burial." Thus far Torat Kohanim. I find this difficult to understand. If it were correct, all the Torah had to write were the words לאמו ולבנו, and I would have derived this information from these two examples. The word לאביו would have been quite unnecessary. Also, according to the argument that seeing the mother is a definite blood-relation therefore I could not have concluded that the father also qualified for the son defiling himself at his grave unless the Torah had stated so specifically, we could have extrapolated this from the words "his son or his daughter." Whose father is known with certainty? Yet the Torah spelled out that the father must defile himself at the grave of a son whose identity as his son is based on an assumption, חזקה only. We cannot even argue that the identity of the father is less certain than the identtiy of either son or daughter (as far as their respective paternity is concerned) for we find that the author of Torat Kohanim used their identities as the basis for his קל וחומר to include the father in the same legislation. So we are back to the question of why the Torah had to spell out that the "son" has to defile himself at the burial of his "father?" If the only reason the Torah wrote "his father" was to teach that the commandment to defile himself applied only to children who were viable, so that the term "father" applied in the full meaning of the word, we could have derived this from the fact that the Torah wrote לאמו though this too could have been derived from קל וחומר seeing we already have the words בנו ובתו. There is no reason to say that we need both the words לאביו ולאמו together in order to exclude aborted fetuses; why would the word "father" or "mother" not be sufficient to teach us that rule? Besides, if we really needed both these words why did the author of Torat Kohanim go to the trouble to demonstrate that each word by itself was required separately? We already needed both words together to exclude the aborted infants from the regulation discussed by the Torah in our verse?

However, another statement concerning the words לאמו ולאביו at the end of Torat Kohanim presents a problem. We read there as follows: "If the Torah had only written the word לאביו and had not also written the word לאמו I would have reasoned that if the Torah demanded that the son defile himself for the burial of his father whose identity is based merely on חזקה, an assumption, such a son most certainly would have to defile himself at the death of his mother who is his biological mother beyond any doubt! I would then have countered that the mother's status as a priest's wife is not constant since she stands to lose it on the death of her husband or through a divorce. Therefore the Torah had to write the word לאמו to also include her in the number of blood relations for whose burial the son who is a priest has to defile himself." We see that the Torah had to write the word לאמו to include a mother who had already forfeited her status as a priest's wife prior to her death! If so, what word is there left for exegetical use to exclude aborted infants from the legislation that the father who is a priest must defile himself on their account? On the other hand, if you use the word to exclude these aborted fetuses, which word is left to include that the son, the priest, must defile himself over a dead mother who had become נתחללה, lost her former status as the wife of a priest? Besides, whence do I know that the father the priest has to defile himself on account of a daughter who had lost her status as the wife of a priest? One could argue that case in either direction! One could say that seeing the son has to honour his mother regardless of her marital status, he also has to defile himself on her account when she dies; on the other hand, one could argue that the Torah had already made it plain that the fact that a woman forfeited her marital status as the wife of a priest did not affect her blood relationship to her son and therefore should have no bearing on the need of her biological son the priest to defile himself at her funeral; also that just as the son has to defile himself for his mother, so, in the event that he has a daughter he has to defile himself if she dies.

Let us examine precisely how the author of Torat Kohanim arrived at the conclusion that the son the priest must defile himself on account of a mother who had lost her status as the wife of a priest. Was this conclusion based on the extraneous word לאמו? Perhaps the word לאמו was not at all superfluous and we needed it to prove that defilement is in order seeing the mother's status was inferior as she was subject to becoming מתחללת, losing her privileges as the wife of a priest, something that cannot happen to the father except if he does something wrong himself. Similarly, the author of Torat Kohanim had been careful to point out already at the beginning of his discourse: "What distinguishes the father? The fact that he is not subject to losing his status as a priest." This meant that this consideration established the basis for a certain asymmetry in the status of the "father the priest" and the "mother the priest's wife." The remarkable thing is that even though in effect the mother died without ever losing her status as the wife of a priest, the fact that she might have done so is considered as sufficient reason to rate her priestly status as inferior to that of her husband. Following this train of thought, we are entitled to the conclusion that if the mother had indeed already been disqualified from being the wife of a priest her son would really not be allowed to defile himself at her burial. We are therefore compelled to say that the author of Torat Kohanim proceeded from the premise that mention of the word לאמו means that a priest has to defile himself for his mother regardless of whether or not she has in effect been disqualified from being the wife of a priest. Now the fact remains that if the Torah had only written the word לאביו I would have been entitled to argue that the mother is inferior in status to her husband the priest even while she enjoys her status as the wife of her husband the priest because of her potential disqualification. Now that the Torah also wrote the word לאמו the Torah made clear that even if she had become disqualified her son the priest has to defile himself on her account when she dies. You can apply the same reasoning to the word ולבתו, and on account of his daughter. By the simple expedient of mentioning the daughter the Torah included a daughter who had become disqualified as a possible wife for a priest. Her father the priest must defile himself on her account in the event she dies. The only factor which governs all this legislation is the biological relationship. Seeing a mother or daughter who do not qualify as a wife for a priest have not ceased to be called mother or daughter respectively, the legislation for the son or father to defile himself is in place. This brings us back to the question why the Torah had to write the word לאמו, seeing we could have derived the law for the mother from the word בתו?

Nonetheless, if the Torah had not written the word לאמו, I would not have concluded that the word לאביו was meant to exclude children which had been aborted before they became viable, but I would have concluded that it excluded אמו, his mother. It is far more more reasonable to exclude the mother of the priest than to search for such far-fetched exclusions as the need to defile oneself at the death of premature stillborn children. The reason I would have excluded the mother would be her status, i.e. the fact that she is constantly subject to losing her status as a priest's wife and the privileges which accrue to her thanks to that fact. We would have limited the fact that the daughter qualifies for her father defiling himself as applying to a daughter who had not actually jeopardised her status as a priest's wife, or at least as potentially a priest's wife, whereas I would have limited the exclusion of the priest's mother to a mother who had actually lost that status. A mother who had not jeopardised her status as the wife of a priest would qualify for her son the priest defiling himself at her funeral. I would have used a קל וחומר extrapolating from the word בתו to arrive at that conclusion. When discussing the status of a daughter, even one who had forfeited her status, we would have remembered that she is still called "his daughter" in the Torah regardless of whether she qualifies for marriage to a priest or not. We would then have reverted to apply that same reasoning to a daughter who had jeopardised her status by comparing her to a mother who had jeopardised her status, based on the unnecessary word לאביו. We would have reasoned that just as a mother who has jeopardised her status as the wife of a priest does not cause her son the priest to defile herself on account of her funeral, so a daughter in her condition most certainly does not confer the duty on her father the priest to defile himself on account of her death. We would have argued this in spite of the fact that the very word בתו in the Torah implies that this daughter did not jeopardise her status as a blood relative by losing her status as a woman a priest may marry. The word בתו would only commit us if I did not either have a restrictive clause or a קל וחומר to counter our reading of the text. We would therefore read the word בתו as applying only to a daughter who had not lost her status, i.e. לא נתחללה.

What emerges from all these examinations of the deeper meaning of our text is that if the Torah had not written the word לאביו which could have misled us into thinking that it was intended to exclude the son the priest defiling himself at his mother's funeral, there would indeed have been no need to write the word לאמו. I would have derived all the הלכות I needed from the words בנו ובתו, his son or his daughter as mentioned earlier. If the Torah had not written the word לאמו from which the error concerning excluding the father whose status is based only on חזקה would have resulted, there would have been no need to write the word לאביו. If so, you would ask why does the Torah not simply write only לאביו, leaving out the word לאמו altogether? In order to forestall this question Torat Kohanim explained that the word was intended to exclude premature stillborn infants. Seeing that this is so there is no more room to argue that the word לאמו or לאביו should have been written by itself. The moment the Torah would write only one of these two words I would arrive at an erroneous conclusion and demolish the whole pyramid we have built thus far. The Torah was therefore very clever in writing exactly what it did. Torat Kohanim was conscious of this and informed us of a possible error we could make if the Torah had not written precisely the words we find in our text.

וקדשתו, "You shall sanctify him, etc." The Torah refrains from addressing the priests in the plural, i.e. as a group as it had done up to now. Yevamot 88 explains that the word וקדשתו is a warning to a priest who married a divorcee, or some other category of woman forbidden to him and who refuses to divorce her. The court is to administer corporal punishment to such a priest and otherwise afflict him until he agrees to divorce such a woman. The words כי את לחם אלוקיך הוא מקריב "for he offers the bread of your G'd" mean that as long as there are many other priests who are ritually able to perform the service in the Temple there is no need to apply corporal punishment to the dissident priest who refuses to divorce a wife he married in violation of Torah law. This explains why the Torah addressed the priest in the singular in this instance.

קדוש יהיה לך, "he shall be holy unto you." This means that in order for him to be holy he has to be a priest unto you. In other words, it is up to you to see that he conducts himself in a holy manner. The emphasis on the words "for he is holy" stems from the premise that holiness is something that is acquired through one's free-willed effort, one does not achieve it because it is forced upon one. How then can the Torah command us to "force" holiness on the priest? This is why the Torah had to repeat: "for he is holy," that the holiness of the priest is of a different nature than that of ordinary Israelites (if and when they achieve it in some measure). We do not impose holiness on the priest. We are commanded to see to it that he does not lose or abandon the holiness which is his by birth. The Torah underlines this at the end of our verse with the words: "for I the Lord sanctify you." G'd allows His Presence to rest on the whole people only through the priests. When there is no priest there is no sacrificial service; when there is no sacrificial service there is no Sanctuary. When there is no Sanctuary G'd's Presence is not at home amongst us.