Parasha: Vayikra · Aliyah: Fifth (Hod)

דבר אל בני ישראל, "speak to the children of Israel, etc." Torat Kohanim uses the expression בני ישראל as excluding Gentiles from offering sin-offerings in the event they violated any of the seven Noachide laws. This appears very difficult. Why should the idea that they could offer such sacrifices ever have arisen so that the Torah needed to refute it? If we would have made a comparison with the Gentile's right to offer free-will offerings, there is no comparison seeing that those offerings were not meant to achieve atonement as we know from Chulin 5 where the Talmud debated the source of denying the heretic the right to offer either total-offerings or sin-offerings respectively. The Talmud there makes it plain that the two kinds of offerings cannot be derived one from the other unless there was something in the text alluding to such entitlement. One argument used there is that if someone were denied to offer a free-will offering it does not follow automatically that he should be barred from offering a sin-offering seeing the latter is designed to help him achieve atonement. The same argument can be used here. As a result of such considerations, the Gentile would have been presumed as entitled to offer sin-offerings. The Torah therefore had to write בני ישראל, to exclude him from the privilege to offer such offerings. It appears to me that the need for this exclusion was accentuated by the word נפש which the Torah used in the very same verse in which it described who would be required (or entitled) to bring a sin-offering. The word נפש suggests that any human being is included in the legislation about to be unveiled. By writing first בני ישראל, the Torah enabled us to use the inclusive term נפש as including proselytes.

The obvious question is why the Torah did not simply omit both the words בני ישראל and נפש, and I would have excluded the Gentiles and included the proselytes? What possible reason could there have been to exclude the proselyte from the privilege to offer a sin-offering that prompted the Torah to write a word designed to include him? This is no objection as we find that the Torah had included proselytes already in 1,2 where the Torah used the term אדם, and this term included proselytes. We would naturally have assumed that proselytes were included only in the right to offer burnt-offerings but not sin-offerings. The Torah therefore had to write the word נפש in our verse to tell us that proselytes have the right to offer sin-offerings. Unless the Torah had also excluded the Gentiles by the restrictive term בני ישראל, one could have argued that proselytes did not need to be specifically included as they had already been included at the beginning of the portion with the word אדם. I would then have concluded that the absence of any further restrictive clause indicated that the Torah has no objection to Gentiles offering sin-offerings. We have now learned that the word נפש here, though inclusive, includes only the proselyte and that the inclusive term אדם at the beginning of our portion was not sufficient seeing the privilege of offering a sin-offering is a far greater privilege than that of offering a burnt-offering. The very fact that a separate paragraph was needed to sanction the offering of sin-offerings altogether indicates that it is a great privilege to be allowed to atone for a sin by offering a sin-offering (only). This privilege could not have been derived merely by exegesis, but needed to be stated outright. Moreover, it appears that the conclusion of Torat Kohanim that the words בני ישראל exclude Gentiles is not based on these words being superfluous, but rather on their plain meaning, i.e. "Jews and not Gentiles." The moment we accept this, the implication is that only natural-born Jews are subject to the legislation in this paragraph as the expression "children of Israel" refers to direct descendants of the patriarch Jacob. If the Torah wanted to include proselytes also, it had to write the word נפש in order for us to understand this beyond doubt. Having said this you will appreciate that though the expression בני ישראל in the whole Torah is not understood as available for exegetical purposes but as telling us to whom the respective legislation is addressed, it excludes Gentiles automatically.

נפש, a person. Torat Kohanim views this word as including proselytes in the group of people entitled to offer sin-offerings. If the Torah had intended to also include women, the Torah should have written אדם כי יחטא as the term אדם includes males and females seeing the Torah referred to both males and females by the collective term אדם in Genesis 5,2.

A moral-ethical meaning of the term נפש as used in this paragraph may be the following. The soul of a human being becomes defective when its owner has sinned intentionally. This is why sinners are referred to as "dead" even while they are still "alive," as we know from Ezekiel 18,32: "for G'd does not desire the death of the dead, etc." The sinner is referred to by the prophet as dead already seeing he no longer has a soul. Solomon refers to something similar in Proverbs 23,2 "if you are someone possessed of a נפש, soul." Our verse tells us that even sins committed inadvertently result in damage to one's soul. While it is true that such inadvertently committed sins do not destroy the soul completely, nonetheless the Torah requires a sin-offering in order for the damage to that soul to be repaired. The offering of that קרבן, the sacrifice whose purpose it is to re-establish the affinity of the soul with its origin, enables the diseased soul to be infused with the spiritual values which will heal its wounds. The same result cannot be achieved if someone who had sinned intentionally were to offer such a sacrifice seeing he had already forfeited his soul. There is nothing left that can be reconstituted until the sinner repented and experienced the beneficial effect of the Day of Atonement, as pointed out by Ezekiel 18,32 והשיבו וחיו, "when you return and cause others to return so that you may live."

אם הכהן המשיח יחטא, If the anointed priest shall sin, etc. The Torah begins its list with the sin of an individual, although the Torah writes לאשמת העם, that this individual thereby brings guilt on the entire people. This is to tell us that an inadvertent sin committed by the High Priest is equivalent to an inadvertent sin by the whole community. If so, why did the Torah not begin the list of people who have to bring sin-offerings with 4,13 where the sin of the community is described, and wait with mentioning a sin by the High Priest until after verse 21 when inadvertent sins by individuals are listed? Perhaps the Torah meant to tell us that in the event of the High Priest and the community having committed an inadvertent sin, the sin-offering of the High Priest takes precedence over that of the community as a whole. The same rule would apply if both the King and the people had committed a sin. The reason given in Horiot 13 is that the High Priest is active in securing atonement whereas the community achieves its atonement passively. I have found in Torat Kohanim on verse 13 (item 240) in our chapter that when both a high Priest and the community have to offer bullocks as sin offerings, the bullock of the High Priest has to be offered first. This ruling is based on the word ואם in verse 13 meaning that what is listed here is only secondary to what has been listed before, i.e. the bullock of the High Priest.

This raises the question why our sages could not have deduced this rule simply from the fact that the Torah has written about the bullock to be offered by the High Priest before it wrote about the bullock to be offered by the community in the event the latter committed an error? Perhaps the sages reasoned that if there were no other hint that the High Priest's bullock takes precedence except the fact that the paragraph about the High Priest sinning was mentioned first, we would have misunderstood the words לאשמת העם as a reference to the error the people had committed which is described in verse 13. That verse deals with the people having acted on the basis of an erroneous decision of the High Court. I would have thought that the reason the Torah described the High Priest's error as "the sin of the people" was because he had concurrred with the erroneous decision of the High Court, or had even been part of the Court which handed down the erroneous decision. Such an interpretation would be wrong. If the High Priest had been part of the High Court which handed down an erroneous decision, his atonement is part of the atonement of the whole people, i.e. he does not have to bring a bullock as an individual sin-offering (Horiot 7). The Torah commenced the sin-offering legislation with the High Priest in order that we should not arrive at an erroneous conclusion. In view of this I would not have been able to use the fact that the first paragraph deals with the sin-offering of the High Priest as proof that his sin-offering takes precedence even over the communal sin-offering. We are still faced with the problem why two separate exegetical comments were necessary to teach us this, a) the word ואם in verse 13, and b) the words כאשר שרף, in verse 21 (compare Torat Kohanim 255 on that verse). I believe that the reason there are two such exegetical openings is simply that if I had only had one, I would have reasoned that the High Priest's offering may be offered first, but does not have to be offered first. Seeing that the Torah provided us with two exegetical openings it is clear that the Torah considers the High Priest's offering taking precedence as mandatory. I have seen a comment by Korban Aharon who claims that unless I had both these expressions available for exegetical use I would have assumed that the High Priest's offering would take only partial precedence but that before he completed his offering one would start with the offering of the community. I do not see any merit in such reasoning. If the author of Korban Aharon were correct the Torah should not have written כאשר שרף את הפר הראשון, "the first bullock" in verse 21, but should have written את הפר האחד, "the one bullock." This would have indicated that the procedure of offering the bullock of the High Priest had not been completed as yet at that stage.

לאשמת העם, so as to bring guilt on the people; we may understand this statement as parallel to what we are taught in Avot 5,18: that if someone is engaged in conferring merits on others he himself will not commit a sin. When the High Priest himself commits a sin, this is proof that the people did not enjoy sufficient merits by reason of his activities that it should have protected him against committing a sin himself. This is the meaning of לאשמת העם.

Torat Kohanim interprets the words אשמת העם as providing us with a clue as to the nature of the sin on account of which the High Priest has to atone with the bullock as a sin-offering. The sin is described as העלם דבר, lack of knowledge of the correct religious ruling which resulted in the people violating a negative commandment involving an activity, as mentioned in verse 13. If all the High Priest had been guilty of was an erroneous activity, some hold that he would be required to bring the same kind of sin-offering as an ordinary individual, whereas others hold that he would not be culpable at all. We learned in Horiot 11 that the words מעם הארץ in verse 27 are proof that if the High Priest had been guilty of a personal sin consisting of a sinful act that he would be free of the obligation to offer a sin-offering altogether. According to Horiot 7 if the High Priest does not happen to be an outstanding scholar he is not required to offer a sin-offering of either kind, not for having committed a sinful act inadvertently nor for having handed down an erroneous ruling upon which the people acted. We need to understand the reason for such an halachah. Perhaps the reason is that if an erroneous ruling is handed down by a High Priest who also happens to be an outstanding scholar and upon whom the people place a great deal of reliance, such an error makes a deep impression on his soul, creating a distance between his soul and its holy roots so that the merits of the Israelites which he has been instrumental in securing for them is insufficient to protect him against harmful effects on his own soul. Such an effect would not occur when the High Priest only erred in personally committing an inadvertent sinful act, or even if a High Priest who was not presumed to be a scholar handed down an erroneous ruling. Such sins would not create the kind of distance between his soul and its holy roots that he would need to bring an additional sacrifice in order to re-establish the bonds with his soul's holy roots. The merits a High Priest confers on the multitude by means of his daily activities are enough to protect the soul of such a High Priest from major harm. G'd would not despise him on account of the error he committed. Furthermore, seeing that the High Priest's error did not involve the people, it does not leave such a deep impression on his soul.

לפני ה׳ אשר באהל מועד before the Lord who is in the Tent of Meeting, etc. In answer to the question why the Torah had to write the words "before the Lord" which had already been written in verse 6, Rabbi Nechemyah in Torat Kohanim says that seeing that we find that Aaron stood beyond the golden altar on the Day of Atonement when he sprinkled the blood on the dividing curtain, we could have assumed that the same procedure was to be followed here. The Torah therefore had to make clear that only the golden altar was "before the Lord," not Aaron. This suggests that except for the fact that the blood of the bullock on the Day of Atonement was sprinkled towards the dividing curtain, the words "before the Lord" in our verse would be superfluous. This is difficult. How would I have known where Aaron was to have stood if the Torah had not written the words "before the Lord?" Seeing that in that event the Torah had not designated a specific spot where Aaron had to stand to perform the sprinkling ceremony, I would have concluded that he had the choice of standing either in front of the golden altar or beyond it. The Torah therefore had to write the words: "in front of the Lord," to tell us that Aaron was to stand in front of the altar. Why was all this necessary? Because we find that there was another occasion when he was to stand beyond the golden altar. Another difficulty is this: why would I assume that Aaron was to perform the ritual of sprinkling the blood towards the dividing curtain while he was standing so far away that the altar was between him and the dividing curtain? Perhaps the words are to tell us that he was to sprinkle the blood on the altar while standing in front of it (facing the dividing curtain)? Seeing that in Leviticus 17,18 the Torah describes Aaron as exiting the Holy of Holies in the direction of the golden altar while putting some of the blood of the bullock on its corners, maybe the Torah wanted to tell us that the same procedure should be followed here, i.e. that when Aaron was to put the blood on the corners of the golden altar he was to do so while having his back to the dividing curtain and facing outwards before pouring out the excess blood at the base of the copper altar? As far as the sprinkling of blood towards the dividing curtain was concerned, however, this should take place when Aaron stood between the golden altar and the dividing curtain? If we had had no other detail than this to worry about, we could have answered this problem.

However, I have seen that the same Rabbi Nechemyah speaking of the meaning of the words "and Aaron shall exit towards the altar which is in front of the Lord" (Leviticus 16,18), questions the meaning of these words. He answers that we find in connection with the bullock which Aaron has to offer concerning all the other inadvertently committed sins that he had to stand on the far side of the curtain with the altar between him and the dividing curtain. I might have concluded that he was to follow the same procedure also with the bullock on the Day of Atonement; therefore the Torah had to write the word ויצא, etc. Where did Aaron stand on that occasion? לפני השם, in front of the Lord." Thus far Rabbi Nechemyah in Torat Kohanim item 45 on 16,18 (item 45). It is difficult to understand why Rabbi Nechemyah had to find justification for the words of the Torah in that verse. Surely the Torah had to inform us (or the High Priest) that the High Priest had to leave the place he stood on and not sprinkle the blood on the altar while standing between it and the dividing curtain. Besides, the Torat Kohanim claims that the only reason we know where the High Priest stood at the time was that the Torah describes him as in the process of exiting towards the golden altar when he sprinkled blood on the dividing curtain. Furthermore, according to what Rabbi Nechemyah said that the words ויצא אל המזבח are not needed seeing that we now learned where Aaron was standing from the words לפני השם in 16,18 instead of as he said in our verse from the words לפני השם in 4,7. Rabbi Nechemyah glibly assumed that the High Priest would have stood outside the altar when sprinkling the blood of the bullock towards the dividing curtain when he performed this procedure on occasions other than the Day of Atonement. Where is there an indication in the text that this was indeed the case? If he were to use the words לפני השם to prove this theory, perhaps those words referred to the need to sprinkle some of the blood onto the altar itself which is the plain meaning of the verse! Besides, if the Torah had omitted both the words ויצא אל המזבח and the words לפני השם, how would I have known where Aaron was to have stood? How could Rabbi Nechemyah therefore even ask what these words were supposed to teach us?

Actually, the exegesis of Rabbi Nechemyah in both parts of Torat Kohanim is most appropriate. Had the Torah not written the words ויצא and not the apparently superfluous words לפני השם, I would simply have concluded that Aaron was free to sprinkle both onto the dividing curtain and onto the altar regardless of whether he stood between the altar and the dividing curtain or between the entrance to the Sanctuary and the golden altar. The Torah mentioned in connection with a wrong decision rendered by the High Court and acted upon by the community that a bullock had to be offered by the High Priest and that the blood was to be sprinkled as atonement on the golden altar (according to the plain meaning of the verse). The Torah also mentioned the golden altar as recipient of the blood of the bullock offered by the High Priest on the Day of Atonement as evident by the words ויצא אל המזבח. These facts established a halachic linkage between these two bullocks and the procedure to be followed concerning them. Not only this, but in both instances the Torah also speaks of the blood requiring to be sprinkled either upon or in the direction of the dividing curtain which is beyond the golden altar. Logic would have told us that the procedure prescribed in chapter 16 must be similar to that prescribed in chapter 4, i.e. that the sprinkling of the blood towards the dividing curtain was to be performed from a position beyond the golden altar, closer to the dividing curtain. We would then have made a מה מצינו kind of exegesis from what was missing in the information described in chapter 4, 13-21 by referring to chapter 16, 3-20. Rabbi Nechemyah tells us in Torat Kohanim that the words לפני השם are intended to prevent us from arriving at such a faulty conclusion. He asks rhetorically: Why were the apparently superfluous words לפני השם written seeing we would have used the same words in 16,18 and have applied them in our verse here? After all, we already know that the golden altar was used for sprinkling of the blood of the bullock offered as a sin-offering by the Torah writing ויצא אל המזבח. The words לפני השם could most certainly not be used to teach us that the High Priest was not to sprinkle the blood of the bullock on the copper altar seeing that altar was outside the Sanctuary. We are therefore back to the question what precisely the words לפני השם have been written for in our context seeing everything else could have been derived from the legislation about the bullock on the day of Atonement. Rabbi Nechemyah answers all these questions saying that the words לפני השם prove that the Torah did not want us to apply the מה מצינו type of exegesis by comparing the procedure to be followed with the bullock in our paragraph to the procedure followed with the bullock on the Day of Atonement. The essential difference between these two procedures involving the bullock as a sin-offering on the Day of Atonement and that in our chapter is, that there is no mention of the sprinkling of the blood on the dividing curtain by the High Priest while the latter is standing between the altar and the Holy of Holies in our verse. This is in contrast to the bullock to be offered on the Day of Atonement, where there is specific mention of this. Had I derived the various procedures applicable to the procedure followed with the bullock on the Day of Atonement, I would have also had to apply the detail of where the blood was to be sprinkled from the procedure outlined in chapter 16. The appearance of the word לפני השם in our verse teaches me not to derive any למוד from the bullock used on the Day of Atonement, be it the sprinkling of the blood on the dividing curtain or the sprinkling of the blood of that animal on the altar. Seeing this is so we would not have had any source upon which to base an assumption as to where the High Priest was to stand during the procedure of sprinkling the blood in the direction of the dividing curtain involving the פר העלם דבר, i.e. the bullock in our chapter. It seems clear therefore, that the words לפני השם must refer to the golden altar and not to the place where the High Priest was standing during all the sprinklings mentioned in our verse. Rabbi Nechemyah explains the words ויצא אל המזבח in 16,18 as follows: "What do these words teach us, i.e. what is the plain meaning of this verse?" Answer: "That the High Priest should not commence the sprinkling of the remaining blood on the altar until he has passed the golden altar on his way out of the Sanctuary." This teaches by inference that prior to that the High Priest had performed the sprinkling of the blood on the dividing curtain while standing between the golden altar and the dividing curtain.

[Although the author continues to dissect the exegetical comments by Rabbi Nechemyah still further, I have decided to omit further details seeing we have shown how he solved the main problem. Ed.]

ואם כל עדת ישראל ישגו, And if the entire community of Israel shall err, etc. The word עדת, "community of" is taken by Torat Kohanim as referring to the Sanhedrin, the Jewish Supreme Court. The word עדה in this verse and the word עדה in Numbers 35,24-25 both are a reference to the Sanhedrin of 71 sages. The word ישראל is presumed to mean the Court which is unique to Israel, i.e. the Court comprising 71 judges. The word ישגו teaches that the legislation introduced here applies only if the Court erred in its judgment and the people acted upon that error in judgment. If the members of the Court themselves acted upon their faulty judgment this is still no reason to apply the legislation stated in this paragraph seeing that the Torah writes הקהל ועשו, "and the community did accordingly." Thus far the Torat Kohanim.

A moral-ethical approach to this verse considers the word ישגו as referring to Israeli society committing moral errors and departing from Jewish norms. As a result of such conduct it would follow that the Jewish Supreme Court will also hand down faulty judgments as the judges and their Torah knowledge reflect the level of the people whom they represent. They are to blame for the people straying as they had not used their authority in controlling public morals. It had been their duty to discipline the individuals who were responsible for a trend away from traditional Jewish values. We have the example of Abbaye in Gittin 60, who erred in a ruling as he had not first obtained permission from his teacher to issue a ruling. We have been told this specifically in Sanhedrin 5.

אשר נשיא יחטא, When the prince (or king) commit an error, etc. This includes a situation where the ruler acted on the basis of a decision handed down by a properly constituted court. As long as the court is not guilty of a sin-offering on account of its decision, the ruler has to bring a a male goat as a sin-offering (Maimonides Hilchot Shigegot 15,8).

או הודע אליו חטאתו, or he has become aware of his inadvertent sin, etc. The Torah here writes "or" seeing in the previous verse it had written ואשם, that he was definite about having sinned. Torat Kohanim concludes that the ruler has to bring an אשם תלוי, a conditional sin-offering, if he is in doubt about having committed the sin in question. Our verse may discuss a situation where after having first offered an אשם תלוי while he was in doubt, the ruler now has to offer a definitive sin-offering as he is now certain that he committed the sin he had been in doubt about.