Parasha: Vayikra · Aliyah: Sixth (Yesod)

ואם נפש אחת תחטא, And if anyone of the common people sin through error, etc. The letter ו at the beginning of the word ואם connects this paragraph to the rules established in the previous paragraphs concerning the details of the procedures.

מעם הארץ, amongst the common people, etc. Horiot 11 teaches that this excludes the High Priest if the latter erred without there having been an erroneous decision handed down by the High Court. In such an event the High Priest does not even have to bring a female goat as a sin-offering to atone for his error. Exegetes also use the letter ם in the word מעם to exclude culpability of a ruler in the event he ate half (part) of the minimum amount of a forbidden food whereas he had eaten the other half before becoming the ruler. The method of exegesis is based on the words מעם הארץ being superfluous in the first instance; the words נפש כי תחטא would have been quite sufficient. The expression is therefore used to exclude prominent individuals such as the High Priest. The additional letter ם is now also available for exegesis "dividing" the concept of עם הארץ. Hence the exegete applies it to a commoner who has consumed part of a forbidden amount of blood, for instance, and was subsequently elevated to the status of king or High Priest before he ate the second part of that blood which constituted an amount for which one is culpable of bringing a sin-offering. The extraneous letter teaches us that such a High Priest or King does not have to bring a sin-offering.

בעשותה, when she (the נפש) has performed it (the sin). This word is extraneous and Torat Kohanim interprets it both restrictively and inclusively. It is used restrictively to teach that if the person who committed the sin did so as a result of carrying out a ruling handed down by the High Court, he is exonerated. He has to bring the sin-offering mentioned in our verse only if he acted in accordance with his own opinion. The Torah had to state this separately because I might have thought that when the Torah legislated the bullock as a sin offering in verse 14, only people who committed that sin as a result of having heard of the High Court's decision would be covered by it, but that if an individual had not heard of that ruling and had nonetheless committed the same sin he would have to bring the she-goat as a sin-offering; the Torah therefore wrote בעשותה that he is to bring the personal sin-offering only if he had acted on his own and there was no faulty ruling by the High Court. The word בעשותה is interpreted inclusively in the event that the individual complied with the High Court's faulty ruling though he was well enough versed in Torah to know that the ruling was faulty. In such a case he cannot shield himself behind the High Court's ruling but has to offer a personal sin-offering of a she-goat for having acted against his better judgment. His sin-offering then is in addition to the bullock prescribed in verse 14. Had the Torah written only בעשות, I would have interpreted it only as inclusive; seeing the Torah added the letter ה at the end, I can also use it restrictively, i.e. only in such a case and not in any other case. When you reflect on this you will understand the Torat Kohanim correctly.

ואם כבש יביא קרבנו, And if he bring a lamb for his offering, etc. Why did the Torah have to make two separate paragraphs out of verses 27-31 and 32-35? Why did the Torah not simply state in the previous paragraph that the individual inadvertent sinner who is the subject in both paragraphs has the choice of bringing either a ewe or a she-goat to serve as his sin-offering? This would have eliminated the need for the entire paragraph commencing with verse 32? I believe that the reason why the Torah chose to write a separate paragraph is the same as why the Torah saw fit to write the paragraph starting with 3,6-11 and a separate paragraph commencing with 3,11-17 when the peace-offering consists of a she-goat. Torat Kohanim on 3,12 (item 185) explained all that. In our instance when the Torah speaks of sheep and goats as sin-offerings rather than as peace-offerings as in chapter three, the Torah (4,31) speaks of separating and burning up on the altar all of the fat of the she-goat sin-offering, comparing it with 3,9 where the fat-tail of sheep is included in the parts to be burned up as a peace-offering. In the case of a sin-offering consisting of a sheep, all of the fat parts are to be offered on the altar (4,35) including the fat-tail. We could not have derived the legislation pertaining to voluntary peace-offerings from legislation describing what is to be done with the same kind of animal when it is offered as a mandatory sin-offering.

Concerning the words וסמך את ידו, that the owner- sinner has to place his weight on the sin-offering prior to its being slaughtered, something that I would have derived from the same rule pertaining to the she-goat sin-offering, Torat Kohanim uses the superfluous words as applying to sin-offerings by a Nazirite or a person struck with Tzora-at after he has been declared healed. Both of these people have to bring a mandatory sin-offering at the end of the term of Nazirism or when the affliction has disappeared (compare Numbers 6,14, and Leviticus 14,11). In either instance the Torah did not mention the need for the person who obtains atonement by means of that offering to perform the rite of placing his weight on the animal. Therefore, the superfluous words וסמך ידו in our verse are used as applicable to those sin-offerings. ושחט אותה לחטאת, and he is to slaughter it to be a sin-offering. Zevachim 7 derives from these words that the act of slaughtering must be accompanied by the intent that the animal in question become a sin-offering. This is another detail which could only have been derived by the repetition of this sentence. In the previous paragraph these words were needed for the plain meaning of the verse. You may learn from this verse that this rule applies both to the sin-offering of a she-goat and that of a ewe. במקום אשר ישחט את העולה, in the place where he (the priest) is to slaughter the burnt-offering. Zevachim 48 asks: "whence do I know that the sin-offering had to be slaughtered on the northern side of the altar? Answer: Leviticus 4,33." The Talmud goes on to ask: "granted that this is true of the slaughtering; whence do I know that this is not only an initial requirement but is mandatory? Answer: "from the additional and otherwise superfluous words במקום אשר ישחט את העולה." Again we have proof that the verse had to be written in two separate paragraphs (29 and 33). The Talmud there goes on to demonstrate that this requirement applies as a mandatory requirement to all categories of sin-offerings. מדם החטאת, from the blood of the sin-offering, etc. Torat Kohanim derives from this superfluous repetition (compare verse 30) that the receiving of the blood into the receptacle provided for this was mandatory. The same kind of exegesis is used to derive halachot from every single repetition in these two paragraphs.

כי תחטא, if one sins, etc. Why did the Torah have to introduce this paragraph with the words ונפש כי תחטא ושמעה?, It would have sufficed to write ונפש כי תשמע. Perhaps the reason is that the person who is the subject of this paragraph is one who had previously denied knowing of testimony which could result in an accused's exoneration. When he does so a second time, he proves that he had already incriminated himself previously. The Torah alludes to this state of affairs by writing נפש כי תחטא, someone who has already sinned, etc. The fact that the potential witness had lied already previously is accounted as a sin. All of this is confirmed by the letter ו the beginning of the word ונפש, at the start of this paragraph.

We may also explain the wording based on Shavuot 30 where we learn of the culpability of someone who denied under oath that he knew testimony (concerning return of a loan being claimed by the creditor) and was aware that he would be guilty of offering a sin-offering even if he had denied testimony only inadvertently, but said person did not know that he had to bring a sin-offering for his perjury. If he did not know that he was culpable for the denial under oath of such testimony though he was aware that he lied, he is not guilty of such a sin-offering. Rashi explains that the Talmud means that only if the accused was unaware that he knew testimony that would help the creditor and was unaware of any penalty for withholding such testimony would he be free from bringing a sin-offering. Maimonides writes in chapter 1 of his Hilchot Shavuot that the definition of an inadvertent sin involving an oath concerning testimony is that the witness was unaware that refusal to testify to something one had knowledge of results in such a witness having to bring a sin-offering, whereas that same person is aware that his oath is sinful and that he perjures himself by swearing it. We note therefore that in order to be guilty of bringing the sin-offering the person had to be aware that his action was both forbidden and a lie. When the Torah writes: ונפש כי תחטא the meaning is that regardless of whether the denial was intentional or unintentional the culprit is aware that he commits a sin; the Torah thereby excludes a person who was unaware of the sin or had forgotten that he had witnessed what he is accused of having witnessed is not obligated to render the oath mentioned in our verse. The Zohar understands this verse as referring to the warnings issued by G'd to the soul which descends into this deceitful world when entering man's body.

ושמעה קול אלה, when he heard a public imprecation, this is explained by the following statement in the Mishnah on folio 30 in tractate Shavuot: "Culpability for this kind of oath exists both when the guilty party swore in the presence of the court or without the presence of a court provided he volunteered the oath. If, however, he merely denied such knowledge without swearing to his denial or saying "Amen," confirming what was put to him, he is not culpable until he had specifically denied his knowing testimony in the presence of a court. So far the view of Rabbi Meir. The other rabbis hold that there is no culpability for a false oath be it in the presence of a court or otherwise unless the perjurer had specifically denied his knowledge of testimony in the presence of a court in so many words, i.e. that he did not know of any testimony which would help the accused. From the above we note that in the view of Rabbi Meir culpability does not depend on what the accused actually said but on what he heard. Hearing a request to testify by the court and failing to do so brings in its wake culpability, i.e. ושמעה קול אלה, as long as he has heard the request to render an oath.

The view of the other rabbis is explained by the ראב"ד and later authorities as follows: If the perjurer heard the demand to testify regardless of whether this was in the presence of a court or not, he is culpable if he denied knowledge even if he did not say "Amen," as long as his denial occurred in the presence of a court even at a different time than that when the demand to render an oath was made upon him. Again, the determining factor in his guilt is the fact that he failed to respond to a request to testify which he had heard with his ears.

Although Maimonides rules in accordance with the view expressed by the majority of the rabbis that the denial must have occurred in the presence of a court in order for the perjurer to be culpable, he disagrees by saying that in order to be culpable in the absence of a court the accused must have at least said "Amen." (compare his rulings in chapter 9 ruling 1 and in chapter 10 ruling 17). This means that he holds that a denial in the absence of a court does not result in culpability unless the potential witness had uttered the word "Amen" in response to a statement suggesting that he had no knowledge of such testimony. ראב"ד disagrees with Maimonides claiming that one cannot rule according to Rabbi Meir. Furthermore, it is not clear why either according to Rabbi Meir or according to the other rabbis it should matter that the court is present at the time the potential witness denies under oath that he has any such knowledge as he is accused of having. Thus far the words of the ראב"ד. The author of כסף משנה adds that he has no idea about Maimonides' source for distinguishing between a denial in the presence of the court and a similar denial in the absence of a court.

I believe that Rabbi Meir and the other rabbis disagreed only in a situation in which the potential witness volunteered his oath outside the confines of a court and did not deny any knowledge in the presence of the court at all. According to Rabbi Meir he would be guilty of perjury seeing Rabbi Meir derives this from a different kind of oath called שבועת הפקדון. Just as someone who denies having received money or objects on trust and he does so at his own behest he is guilty of perjury even if such an oath did not take place in the presence of a court. The other rabbis adhere to the principle known as דון מינה ואוקי באתרא, that one may derive the essential parts of one legislation and apply it to a different type of legislation without applying all the details pertaining to the legislation which serves as the source of the exegesis. [The principle is explained by Rashi in Shevuot 31. Ed.] In situations where the supposed witness is challenged to testify by third parties but not in the presence of a court, and the supposed witness declares that he does not know any such testimony, he does not have to bring a sin-offering even if he subsequently admits before a court that he had lied. When such a lie had occurred in front of a court and is subsequently retracted, the liar is guilty of the sin-offering according to all the rabbis.

Maimonides holds that any oath which is not sworn to in the presence of a court needs to be initiated by the person who swears it in order for him to be guilty of perjury and the sin-offering which is required. He derives this rule from the following words in the Mishnah quoted in Shevuot 31: "What is meant by the term שבועת העדות, "an oath concerning testimony?" If a party said to two others: "please testify on my behalf that you have been witnesses to a certain occurrence;" if the two people in question reply: "we swear we have no such knowledge," or if they simply say: "we do not know anything about the matter you want us to testify to (without volunteering an oath)" and the first party challenges them to confirm this on oath and they confirm it by saying "Amen," they are guilty of perjury. If the person demanding such an oath repeated his request five times but never in the presence of a court, and received a negative answer each time and both parties subsequently come to court where the ones who had denied their knowledge five times now admit that they did have knowledge, they are not guilty concerning their previous denials. If they deny their knowledge also in front of the court and are subsequently found to have lied, they are guilty of a sin-offering for every previous denial separately. Thus far the Mishnah. We note that according to the text of the Mishnah the witnesses had said "Amen." Who is the author of that Mishnah? If it is Rabbi Meir and there was no subsequent denial in the presence of a court we would have a disagreement between Rabbi Meir and the other rabbis in the previous Mishnah followed by this Mishnah in which all rabbis are agreed. We are entitled to view this anonymous Mishnah as reflecting the opinion of Rabbi Meir, seeing he is not quoted as diagreeing. Seeing that Maimonides demanded that the perjurer must have first denied his knowledge in front of a court before becoming liable for the sin-offering even if his original denial had been at his own initiative, it is clear that he interpreted the Mishnah according to the consensus of the Rabbis. The Mishnah spoke of the perjurers having said "Amen." When did they do so? When they were not in the presence of a court, for if they had denied their knowledge in front of the court they would have been guilty of perjury according to all opinions even without having uttered the word "Amen" as confirmation of an oath. It emerges that according to the view of the majority of rabbis the word "Amen" is the minimum required for such potential witnesses to become guilty of perjury when not in the presence of a court. [At any rate our author has succeeded in demonstrating that Maimonides did not rule according to a minority view so that the complaint of ראב"ד is not in place. Ed.]

Tossaphot, aware of an imprecision in the text of the Mishnah, state that this is due to the Mishnah's attempt to be brief; this is true if we were to assume that the alternative would have been for the perjurers to have said: "we do not know of any testimony we can offer on your behalf." Maimonides does not agree with this but holds that any oath sworn outside a court must be volunteered, i.e. the perjurer must have recited the substance of his oath with his own words. His reason is that the Torah discusses an occurrence in front of a court as we know from the words אם לוא יגיד, "if he will not reveal it." Only in such a situation is it enough for the perjurer to have merely heard the demand to testify, i.e. ושמעה קול for him to become guilty without uttering the substance of what he denies.

Shevuot 32 asks: "whence do we know that the denial of the witnesses's knowledge must have occurred in the presence of the court so that he would only then be guilty for such denial (perjury)?" Abbaye answered there that we derive this from the words ואם לוא יגיד, "if he refuses to testify," and that these words only make sense in a setting in which one normally testifies, i.e. a court. Rabbi Papa counters that if we were to accept the exegetical comment by Abbaye we would come to the conclusion that even an oath freely volunteered but not within the confines of a court would not be subject to the laws of perjury seeing that it was not sworn at a place defined as one designated to hear testimony? This argument is rejected in light of a Baraitha which interprets the word לאחת, "one of" in 5,4 to mean that the party who has become guilty of perjury is liable for each violation separately. If we were to assume that any oath must be sworn only in front of a court in order for one to become guilty of perjury, why would we have to be told that if the perjurer perjured himself five times in the presence of a court (on the same subject) he needs to bring only a single sin-offering? It follows that an oath may be sworn to also outside a court, whereas the denial must have taken place in front of a court for the perjurer to be liable. All this teaches that the oath which is sworn in the presence of the court is identical to the one sworn outside the court, and that one is certainly liable for perjury if one had sworn falsely outside the court. Having accepted this, it makes no difference if the party who is the subject in our verse was sworn by others in the presence of the court or elsewhere.

This is important if we want to understand Maimonides' source for his ruling. The use of the word לאחת which we quoted to mean that the perjurer is liable for every previous denial is really problematical; after all, 5,4 speaks of שבועת בטוי [undertakings by a person on oath to either do something or not do something. Ed.]. How can we apply the rules which pertain to such an oath to the type of oath discussed in 5,1? The two types of oath are so dissimilar that we would need an exegetical instrument to permit us to derive הלכות applicable to the one kind of oath to the other! We are forced to conclude that the only situation in which the two oaths are comparable is when the שבועת העדות, the oath concerning testimony, has been entered into voluntarily just as the שבועת בטוי discussed in 5,4. In the case where the potential witness only responded to a challenge to deny his knowledge on oath there is no way we can derive a הלכה applicable to שבועת בטוי as applicable also to שבועת העדות. This is why Maimonides derives culpability in the case of שבועת העדות only when such denial occurred in the presence of the court. He saw no way of proving culpability of שבועת העדות which was imposed by the creditor on the supposed witnesses by comparison to culpability of the person who swore a שבועת בטוי. Let us now return to Rabbi Papa's suggestion that if we were to use Abbaye's interpretation of the words לוא יגיד, we would have to conclude that every oath has to be sworn in the presence of a court in order for someone to legally incriminate himself as guilty of perjury! We do not find that Abbaye rejected Rabbi Papa's conclusion! He only rejected Rabbi Papa's exegetical proof. This means that Abbaye agreed with Rabbi Papa that culpability for שבועת העדות, the denial of knowledge as a witness which is the result of the creditor initiating the formula of the oath, must have occurred in the presence of a court in order for the perjurer having to offer a sin-offering. Thus Abbaye's view is identical with the ruling of Maimonides.

According to all the foregoing we may interpret the words ושמעה קול אלה as referring to the perjurer having denied knowledge of what he had been invited to confirm even if he did not say "Amen." This must have taken place in the presence of a court as we derived from the words אם לוא יגיד. In the event he denied his knowledge by uttering an oath, he would also be liable for another aspect of this oath, the one that we derive from the גזרה שוה of the word תחטא occurring both here and in connection with the שבועת פקדון, (5,21) an oath in which one swears not to have been guilty of carelessness or other trespass involving an object entrusted to one to keep on behalf a third party, providing the denial occurred in court. As to the conclusion of the Talmud on Shevuot 32 that oaths may be sworn outside the court and result in the penalty for perjury, this refers to that kind of oath, i.e. someone denying that he had dealt treacherously with his fellow man's property while in fact having done so. [The unnecessary repetition of the word תחטא in those two paragraphs is the exegetical basis for learning across from one kind of oath to another. Ed.].

We have now completely understood the way Maimonides interprets our verse. Our verse speaks of a single scenario namely that the creditor beseeches the witness to testify on his behalf in court and the (so-called) witness refuses to respond while in court. Both the two requirements mentioned in our verse are mandatory in order for the witness to become guilty of the sin-offering. 1) The attempt to make the witness deny on oath must occur in court, whereas if the denial occurred outside the court it does not result in a sin-offering even if at a different time the same witness had denied this in court. 2) The denial has to take place while the party denying is in court. If that were not the case the liar would not even be guilty of the sin-offering if he had volunteered a false oath outside the court as we derive from the comparison with the שבועת פקדון and the words תחטא that he would not be guilty. In the event that the denial occurred in the court whereas the oath had been sworn outside the court, we derive from the comparison with שבועת בטוי that if the perjurer had uttered the words of the oath himself that he is culpable for swearing a false oath. Anyone studying this carefully will agree that Maimonides' ruling is most illuminating and is fully supported by the text of our paragraph.

ואם לא תגיע ידו די שה, if he is unable to afford a lamb, etc. This means that the individual in question can afford to present more than the two turtle-doves which are the next cheaper sin-offering and burnt offering the Torah demands of him. As long as he is not able to afford a lamb as his sin-offering, he is allowed to offer the bird-offerings designated for a needy person.

The word ידו is interpreted by Torat Kohanim to mean that the individual in question does not have to borrow money to enable him to purchase a lamb for his sin-offering. Neither do we tell such a person to work harder in order to earn the money necessary to purchase the lamb. The reason for this is the principle חביבה מצוה לשעתה, it is important to perform a commandment at the time it is due rather than to perform it somewhat later but in a more perfect manner (based on Pessachim 68). Torat Kohanim describes the alternatives as follows: "the meaning of the words "if his means do not suffice for a lamb" is that even if the individual in question owned a lamb but he did not have the wherewithal for his elementary needs, i.e. for clothing, food or shelter, he is considered as if he did not have a lamb to offer. Torat Kohanim derives this from the expression די שה, "sufficient to afford to offer a lamb."

I have seen a comment by Rabbeynu Hillel who defines "his needs" as referring to the lamb for the offering which this individual does not possess. Halachah demands that the owner of the lamb personally bring it to the courtyard of the Temple, etc. This explanation seems rather forced seeing it does not take more effort or time to bring a lamb to the Temple than it takes to take two turtle-doves to the Temple. If the Rabbi referred to the effort to bring a relatively sizable lamb to the Temple, let him bring the money instead and purchase it from the Temple-treasury. If Rabbeynu Hilel referred to the need to perform סמיכה on the lamb, something that need not be performed on the birds, this too is no argument as the performance of סמיכה is an initial requirement only; the requirement is not mandatory so that failure to perform it would invalidate the offering. Why should such an individual rather not bring the offering required of him and instead bring the offering designated for a needy person? We have learned at the end of tractate Nega-im (14,12) that if a well-to-do person offered the sin-offering designated for a poor person he has not fulfilled his obligation. The same applies to all the offerings commonly known as קרבן עולה ויורד, offerings which vary in value with the economic situation that the person who has to offer a sin-offering finds himself in. Maimonides also rules this way in Hilchot Shega-got chapter 10. The requirement of placing one's weight on the lamb is only meant to enhance the commandment and does not in any way interfere with the atonement value of the offering for the sinner in question as we know from Zevachim 6.

Torat Kohanim interprets the words "if she cannot afford a lamb" in Leviticus 12,8 where the need for a woman who gave birth to bring a sin-offering is discussed, as follows: "If she owns a lamb but does not have her basic needs, how do I know that she need only bring the offering designated for a poor person?" Answer: "The Torah writes די שה, sufficient for a lamb." The reason Torat Kohanim had to use these words there in the same sense as in Leviticus 12,8 is that one of the offerings of a mother who has given birth is a burnt-offering and such burnt-offering requires to be accompanied by a drink-offering נסכים. This drink-offering is mandatory. Had the Torah not written די שה in that verse I could not have derived this meaning from our verse where we discussed an offering that is purely a sin-offering. As a result of such considerations, why did the Torah not merely write these words in Leviticus 12,8 and I would have applied them here also? There was no need to tell us that the sinner may forego the need for סמיכה, as we could have applied a קל וחומד, an inference from minor to major; if in the case of a sin-offering which does not involve a mandatory drink-offering, a person who owns a lamb but does not have money for his basic needs is allowed to bring the sin-offering applicable to a poor person in its place, then a mother who finds hereself in a similar economic situation and who would have to find the means for an additional drink-offering most certainly would be allowed to offer a poor person's offering instead, and I would not need additional superfluous words for such exegesis. I believe therefore that I was right. As long as the sinner has more than enough for two birds but not enough for a lamb, he is entitled to bring the offering designated for a poor person. Korban Aharon supports my interpretation.

מחטאתו אשר הטא, concerning the sin which he committed, etc. In connection with the offering by a rich man the Torah writes: מחטאתו, whereas when describing the parallel offering by a poor man the Torah writes: מחטאתו אשר חטא. Why the difference between these descriptions? Torat Kohanim item 343, elaborating on verse 13 which deals with the sin-offering to be brought by the poorest of the poor, claims that I might have thought that the value of the various sin-offerings was determined by the relative severity of the sin it was to atone for; in order to disabuse us of such thinking the Torah wrote מאחת מאלה, that either kind of sin-offering could atone for either kind of sin and that what determined the kind of sin-offering was only the economic situation of the sinner. The reason for this comment is the fact that this paragraph deals with three distinctly different kinds of sins for which sin-offerings have to be brought. We have the sin of someone who is ritually impure introducing impurity into the Temple precincts (5,2), a sin which carries the Karet penalty if committed intentionally. This is the most severe sin for which a sin-offering is acceptable. We have the sin (5,1) of perjury committed by someone who withholds relevant testimony on behalf of a fellow Jew, a sin which is punishable by a sin-offering either if committed inadvertently or if committed intentionally. This sin is less severe than the one which preceded it, though it is more severe than the one involving שבועת בטוי an undertaking accompanied by an oath to do or not to do something and the failure to honour one's undertaking. This sin is listed in the Torah (5,5) after the שבועת העדות as it is relatively minor. Violation of שבועת בטוי is punishable by a sin-offering only if it occurred inadvertently. As a result of these distinctions I could have thought that different sins require sin-offerings of different value in relation to the severity of the sin. Therefore the Torah tells us in verse 13 that the value of the sin-offering is not related to the nature of the sin but to the ability of the sinner to afford the offering in question.

The hypothesis that we could have misunderstood the intent of the Torah unless the Torah had written the words מאחת מאלה in verse 13 is baffling. After all, the Torah had spoken specifically of the sinner's inability to afford a certain kind of offering in our verse! This made it abundantly clear that the kind of sin-offering to be brought was not determined by the kind of sin but by the economic status of the sinner! Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi suggests in his commentary on verse 13, that the words מחטאתו אשר חטא were needed to prevent us from misinterpreting the words ואם לא תגיע ידו to mean that if the sinner's "hand" had not "touched" i.e. been guilty of committing a trespass involving the need to offer a sheep as a sin-offering, but had been guilty only of a minor trespass, that such a sinner has to bring the sin-offering consisting of two turtle-doves. If the sinner had not even been guilty of a sin severe enough to require a sin-offering consisting of two turtle-doves, then he has to bring only a sin-offering consisting of a meal-offering." The words מחטאתו אשר חטא were written after the Torah discussed a lesser of the three categories of sin mentioned in our paragraph i.e. שבועת העדות, so that we would not err and think that the sin-offering consisting of turtle-doves is applicable only for atonement of the sin of שבועת העדות, but not to any of the categories of sin dealt with in this paragraph. Rabbi Mizrachi elaborates with further examples which we need not repeat here. I believe that his approach is very forced, seeing it is hard to imagine someone misinterpreting the words ואם לא תשיג ידו as referring to a greater sin.

Perhaps Torat Kohanim was prompted by the following consideration: If the Torah had not written the words מאחת מאלה, I would have thought that if someone committed the most severe of the sins listed in this paragraph, the bringing of impurity into the precincts of the Tabernacle, the only kind of sin-offering acceptable from such a sinner would be a four-legged animal, a ewe. As to the line in verse 7: "if he cannot afford a lamb he should bring two turtle-doves, etc," this alternative does not apply except in the case where he was guilty of the lesser offence such as שבועת העדות which, because of the relatively milder nature of the sin, requires less in the way of atonement. If someone were to argue that the Torah's concession to the sinner extended even to a poor man guilty of bringing a sin-offering consisting of a sheep for a more serious offence, let him prove his case! Similarly, when the Torah wrote in verse 11 ואם לא תשיג ידו לשתי תורים, that if the sinner cannot afford two turtle-doves that he should bring a meal-offering as his sin-offering, I would have assumed that the Torah made this concession in a case where the sinner was guilty of only the least severe of the sins mentioned in this paragraph, the sin of שבועת בטוי. I would not have assumed that such a meal-offering could serve as a sin-offering for the sin of שבועת העדות which is more severe than שבועת בטוי. It would most certainly not suffice to achieve atonement for the severe sin of bringing impurity into the confines of the Holy Tabernacle. I would have been confirmed in this attitude by the fact that in all the sins listed by the Torah up to now where sin-offerings are called for the Torah never offered the concession of a bird or meal-offering replacing a sin-offering consisting of a four-legged animal. I would have reasoned "why should the Torah deal so leniently with someone guilty of a sin which carries the Karet penalty?" I would have assumed that the inexpensive sin-offering was certainly acceptable only for the lesser sins. I would have reasoned as follows: The wealthy person has to bring a four-legged animal as his sin-offering regardless of the relative severity or mildness of his sin. The Torah made a concession to the poor if he happened to have been guilty of the sin of שבועת העדות, in which case he could bring the turtle-doves. If he had been guilty of the sin of bringing impurity into the Tabernacle however, the Torah did not exempt him from the rule applicable to sin-offerings in נפש כי תחטא בשגגה, described in chapter four. If a person is destitute and committed only the sin of שבועת בטוי, the Torah relents and allows him to offer a sin-offering consisting only of a meal-offering. If that same destitute person was guilty of the sin of שבועת העדות, which is more severe, he cannot absolve his guilt by offering only a meal-offering as his sin-offering. This is the major error I could have made unless the Torah had written the words מאחת מאלה in verse 13. By means of these two words the Torah placed all the sins in the same category to teach us that the meal-offering as a sin-offering is acceptable to G'd provided the sinner is so destitute that he cannot even afford to bring two turtle-doves. This is what the author of Torat Kohanim had in mind when he wrote: "I could have thought, etc." When he wrote that "we would have made a division in comparing the mild sins to the severe sins," this is an error; the text there should have read: "the severe sins to the milder sins."

Another method of explaining the words of the Torat Kohanim is by remembering that the paragraph deals with three separate sins and I notice that the Torah also describes three different kinds of sin-offerings. I would assume that the Torah arranged the list of the sin-offerings in keeping with the type of sins they are to atone for. The Torah therefore commences with the sin-offering to be offered in respect of the most severe of these three sins by saying that the sinner has to offer a female sheep. In the event that the sinner in question could not afford that, he should bring the kind of offering that would be appropriate for the sin mentioned by the Torah prior to this one, i.e. the sin of שבועת העדות. The sin-offering should consist of two birds regardless of the sinner's economic situation, whereas the sin-offering consisting of such birds would be acceptable as atonement for the sin of bringing impurity into the Temple only if the sinner was poor. The words ואם לא תשיג ידו, "if he cannot afford even a bird-offering" in verse 11 apply to the sin-offering if one was guilty of שבועת העדות, for which the regular sin-offering consists of two turtle-doves. If the sinner could not afford this, he would be allowed to bring the sin-offering appropriate for the next milder sin, i.e. שבועת בטוי.

As a result of such reasoning the sin-offering appropriate to atone for שבועת בטוי would be the least expensive one, a meal-offering, even if the offender were a wealthy individual. Similarly, a wealthy individual would be allowed to bring only a bird-offering for the sin of שבועת העדות even if he were well to-do. If he were especially poor however, he would only have to bring the meal-offering. If someone were guilty of bringing impurity into the Tabernacle and he is well to-do, he will have to bring a sheep or goat; if he is poor he would bring turtle-doves but not a meal-offering. This is what the author of Torat Kohanim meant when he wrote that the serious ones would be atoned for by a sheep. He meant that only in respect of the serious sins were sheep required as the sin-offering. No sheep as a sin-offering would be called for in respect of minor sins such as the two types of oaths even if the people who had committed these offences were wealthy individuals. Torat Kohanim did not worry that you might misinterpret what the Torah wrote and think that only a sheep or goat would be acceptable as atonement for the sin of impurity seeing that the Torah had written in the verse following the requirement to offer a sheep: "if he is unable to afford a sheep, etc. (compare verses 6 and 7)." However, the Torah had to tell us that whereas the less serious offences (the oaths) did not require a sheep or goat as a sin-offering, they did require bird-offerings. The bird-offerings themselves are required only for the sin of שבועת העדות, whereas the sin of שבועת בטוי can be atoned for by a sin-offering consisting of a meal-offering. Torat Kohanim also did not worry that someone might think that it would not be acceptable under any circumstances to try and atone for the sin of שביעת העדות with a meal-offering, seeing the Torah wrote immediately following the requirement to offer the bird-offerings: "if he is unable to afford this he may bring a meal-offering as his sin-offering" (compare verses 10 and 11).

As a result of all these considerations you would have concluded that 1) a sheep is only called for if the most severe of the three sins mentioned in this paragraph had been committed; 2) a bird-offering is called for in case the sin was relatively mild, but not in case it was the mildest of the three; 3) the appropriate sin-offering for the mildest of the three offences is the meal-offering. The most severe sin could not be atoned for by a mere meal-offering under any circumstances.

[At this point the author devotes several pages to demonstrate why every line in the Torat Kohanim is justified. The interested reader is referred to the original somewhat tedious presentation. Ed.]